Essays on the U.S Biofuel Policies: Welfare Impacts and the Potential for Reduction of GHG Emission by Wamisho Hossiso, Kassu
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural 
Economics Agricultural Economics Department 
Fall 12-15-2012 
Essays on the U.S Biofuel Policies: Welfare Impacts and the 
Potential for Reduction of GHG Emission 
Kassu Wamisho Hossiso 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, kassuwam@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss 
 Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons 
Wamisho Hossiso, Kassu, "Essays on the U.S Biofuel Policies: Welfare Impacts and the Potential for 
Reduction of GHG Emission" (2012). Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural Economics. 16. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss/16 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses in 
Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
  
 
ESSAYS ON THE U.S. BIOFUEL POLICIES: WELFARE IMPACTS AND THE 
POTENTIAL FOR REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSION 
 
 
By 
Kassu Wamisho Hossiso 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Faculty of 
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska 
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Major: Natural Resource Sciences 
 
Under the Supervision of Professor Richard K.Perrin 
 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
December, 2012
  
ESSAYS ON THE U.S. BIOFUEL POLICIES: WELFARE IMPACTS AND 
THE POTENTIAL FOR REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSION 
Kassu Wamisho Hossiso, Ph.D. 
        University of Nebraska, 2012 
 
Adviser: Richard K.Perrin and Karina Schoengold 
This dissertation study investigates the impact of the US biofuel policies related to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission regulation, tax credit and renewable fuel standard 
(RFS2) mandate over production and consumption of ethanol as well as technical and 
environmental performance of corn ethanol plants. The study develops analytical models 
and provides quantitative estimation of the impact of various biofuel policies in each of 
the three chapters.   
Chapter 1 of this dissertation examines the tradeoff between achieving the 
environmental goal of minimizing life cycle GHG emissions and minimizing production 
costs in recently built dry-grind corn ethanol plants. The results indicate that the average 
ethanol plant is able to reduce GHG emissions by 36 % relative to the level under cost 
minimization, but production costs are 22 % higher.  To move from least cost to least 
emissions allocations, ethanol plants would on average produce 25 % more of wet 
byproduct and 47% less of dry byproduct.  
Using a multi-output, multi-input partial equilibrium model, Chapter 2 explores 
the impact of the tax credit and RFS2 mandate policy on market price of ethanol, 
byproducts, corn, and other factor inputs employed in the production of corn ethanol. In 
the short-run, without tax credit ethanol plants will not have the incentive to produce the 
  
minimum level of ethanol required by RFS2. In the long-run, if ethanol plants to have the 
incentive to produce the minimum RFS2 mandate without tax credit policy, gasoline 
price will need to increase by order of 50% or more relative to the 2011 price.  
  Chapter 3 develop meta-regression model to investigate the extent to which 
statistical heterogeneity among results of multiple studies on soil organic carbon (SOC) 
sequestration rates can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies in response 
to conventional tillage (CT) and no-till (NT). Regarding the difference in the rate of SOC 
sequestration between NT and CT, our results shows that the percentage of heterogeneity 
in the true treatment effect that is attributable to between-study variability is 49%, 
whereas 51 % is attributable to within-study sampling variability.  
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 Chapter 1: The Shadow Price of GHG Reduction in Corn 
                    Ethanol Plants 
 
Abstract  
 
This article examines the cost of reducing CO2 emissions in a sample of recently built 
dry-grind corn ethanol plants. The analysis estimates a translog minimum value function 
that represents both the minimum cost and the minimum CO2 emissions for given levels 
of ethanol production. The results indicate that the average plant is able to reduce GHG 
emissions by 36 percent relative to the level under cost minimization, but production 
costs are 22 percent higher. The reallocations by which these emissions reductions are 
achieved are primarily the substitution of wet for dry distillers grains, with the 
corresponding reduction in the use of natural gas and electricity. To move from least cost 
to least emissions allocations, ethanol plants would on average produce 25 % more of wet 
byproduct and 47% less of dry byproduct. Comparing results across observations, the 
estimated shadow cost of emission abatement ranges from $86 to $190 per ton of CO2, 
with average value of $124 per ton. This implied shadow cost of abatement can be used 
as a bench mark for pollution trading and serves to assess the potential response to 
biofeul regulations.  
Key words: GHG abatement, shadow price of abatement, corn ethanol 
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 1.1 Introduction  
 
A common approach to measuring environmental efficiency when desirable and 
undesirable outputs are produced jointly is to treat the undesirable output as another 
variable into the production model, either as another input or as a weakly disposable bad 
output
1
. Such analysis is frequently based on a primal representation of the technology 
using input- and output-oriented distance functions. 
In this article we followed different route to measure the environmental efficiency of 
an industry based on a minimum value function estimated from data obtained from a 
sample of corn ethanol plants in the Midwest US.  CO2 emissions in ethanol plants are 
not directly measured, but are estimated from inputs used and outputs produced. Because 
CO2 emissions are a linear function of outputs and inputs, the minimum value function 
for emissions has the same algebraic structure and parameters as the minimum value 
function for net cost, defined here as the cost of inputs minus the revenue from 
byproducts.  In the case of emissions, emissions coefficients for the inputs and outputs 
are substituted for the prices of outputs and inputs.  Given observations on firm behavior, 
it is possible to estimate the minimum cost function, which then also provides an estimate 
of the minimum GHG function. Our article exploits the relationship between the linearity 
of the materials balance equation and that of the minimum cost function to allow us to 
calculate the cost forgone to achieve the maximum decrease in GHG emissions. 
                                                 
1
 Strong disposability implies that it is free of charge to dispose of unwanted inputs or 
outputs, weak disposability implies expensive disposal.  
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Empirically, we estimate the minimum value function with a translog specification, using 
plant-level data from a sample of recently constructed ethanol plants in the Midwest.  
 The earliest study to incorporate undesirable outputs in efficiency measurement was 
Pittman (1983) who developed an adjusted Tornqvist productivity index in which 
environmental effects are treated as additional undesirable outputs whose disposability is 
costly.  Färe et al. (1989) used Pittman’s data to evaluate environmental performance of 
US fossil fuel-fired electric utilities using a nonparametric hyperbolic distance function. 
Extending this, Färe et al. (1993) used a parametric mathematical programming technique 
based on translog output distance function to calculate an enhanced hyperbolic efficiency 
measure. Several empirical applications and extensions followed these seminal works.  
Later a directional distance function was developed that treats desirable and undesirable 
outputs asymmetrically (Chambers, Chung, and Färe 1996; Chung, Färe, and Grosskopf 
1997; Färe et al. 2005; Ball et al. 2004; Cuesta, Lovell, and Zofio 2009).  These 
directional output or input distance functions were estimated either using deterministic 
(parametric or nonparametric) or stochastic (exclusively parametric) techniques, but they 
do not consider pollution abatement based on emission content of the inputs and outputs 
considered in the production process. 
One of the advantages of our modeling approach is allowing an industry to choose 
optimal combination inputs and byproducts that minimize bad output based on the 
materials flow coefficients of a particular input, instead of using market price 
information. In addition, this technique does not need an extra pollution variable in the 
production process. Our approach shares some methodological similarity with recent 
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measures of environmental efficiency based on the material balance concept (Coelli, 
Lauwers, and Van Huylenbroeck 2007; Welch and Barnum 2010; Lauwers 2009; 
Sesmero, Perrin, and Fulginiti 2010). However these studies were implemented with data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), a technique which is not able to accommodate 
measurement errors in input and output without bootstrapping. 
The objective of this article specifically is to examine the potential for corn ethanol 
plants to reduce GHG emissions by reallocation among inputs and byproducts, and the 
cost of such reductions.  The tradeoff between these two goals describes the opportunity 
cost of reducing CO2 emissions - two points on the supply curve for emissions 
reductions. The results of our model provide valuable information to the ethanol industry 
in its efforts to reduce emissions to comply with current and potential regulations. The 
2007 US Energy Independent and Security Act (EISA) required 20 to 60 percent life 
cycle GHG emissions reductions relative to gasoline for biofuels to qualify in meeting 
mandated levels of renewable fuels. The legislation requires a reduction of 20 percent for 
new corn-ethanol plants, 50 percent for other advanced biofuels and 60 percent for 
cellulosic ethanol. The low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) of California also requires a 10 
percent reduction in the carbon content of California’s transportation fuels by 2020.  The 
above regulations require that the GHG from corn ethanol have to be assessed on a full 
life cycle basis including emissions from energy consumed at the ethanol plants, which 
we examine here.  
In the next section, we develop the theoretical and analytical techniques to examine 
the efficiency measure of the ethanol plant. The fundamental theory is based on the 
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minimum value function for cost and GHG. In section 3, we present data and the 
econometric estimation procedure. The empirical results of our application and 
implication of this article are elucidated in section 4.  Summary and concluding remarks 
are then provided in section 5. 
1.2 Theoretical Model 
 
 Net ethanol cost is defined here as the cost of three inputs minus the revenues from 
the two by products.  The minimum cost function allows us, using Shephard's lemma, to 
obtain the optimal level of inputs given quantities of ethanol produced (e), input prices 
facing the firm (W), byproduct prices facing the firm (P), and the level of fixed inputs 
(Z).  The mimimum plant-level net ethanol cost function we therefore define as: 
 
}),,,(|{min),,,(
,
TZYXePYWXZPWeC
yx
N            (1)                            
where : e is ethanol output measured in gallons; X is a vector of inputs of corn in bushels, 
natural gas in MBTU, electricity in KWH; and  Y is a vector of ethanol byproducts, dry 
distillers grain (DDG) in tons  of dry matter and  modified wet distillers grain (WDG) in 
tons of dry matter.  W and P are vectors of strictly positive prices for factor inputs and 
byproduct respectively, Z is the quantity of other fixed inputs (in $).  W and P are 
exogenous to ethanol producers. T is the firm's production possibilities set and is 
assumed to be a nonempty, compact, and convex set. Under the assumptions made on T, 
),,,( ZPWeC N  is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, homogenous of degree 
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one in variable input and byproduct  prices and in fixed input quantities, concave  in 
prices, and convex in quantities (Diewert 1971; Diewert & Wales 1987).  
By applying Shephard’s lemma, the n vector of constant output factor demand  and 
byproduct supply  functions are derived from the specified cost function by simply 
differentiating with respect to input prices and by product prices, respectively.  
),,,( ZPWeX
W
C c
i
i
N



  and ),,,( ZPWeY
P
C c
i
i
N



                                                   
 (2)                                   
The above conditional factor and by product functions are homogenous of degree zero in 
factor and by product prices respectively.  
Given the way CO2 emissions are calculated by regulators, there is a linear 
relationship between emissions and observable input use and output. Specifically, CO2 
emissions are linearly related to the quantity of ethanol and two byproducts produced.  
We can therefore define the minimum achievable GHG emissions, for a given level of 
ethanol output, as   
}),,,(|{),,,( min
,
TZYXebYaXZbaeGHG
yx
M                   (3) 
Where a and b  are the vectors of GHG emission coefficients per unit of factor input 
X and by products Y, respectively.  It is obvious that this minimum function is the same 
as the cost minimum function in (1) above, but with GHG coefficients substituted for 
prices as arguments of the function. Estimation of the minimum cost function then 
provides an estimate of the minimum GHG function.   Again invoking Shephard's lemma, 
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evaluating the derivatives of the MGHG  function at emissions coefficients yields GHG 
minimizing allocation of inputs and byproduct respectively: 
)),,(,( ZbaeX
a
GHG g
i
i
M



 and )),,(,( ZbaeY
b
GHG g
i
i
M



                (4) 
GHG
M
 is achieved by allowing the firm to choose optimum combination of inputs 
and byproduct sets that minimize GHG.  The emission coefficients a and b   reinforce the 
explicit link between production technology and environmental outcomes. This technical 
approach is perceived as a material-balance principle which is the tenet of the law on the 
conservation of matter/energy. This law is an essential biophysical condition stating that 
the flow of materials taken from the environment for economic activities generates a flow 
of materials from the economy back into the environment that is of equal weight. 
Theoretical and methodological approach of environmental efficiency measures based on 
the material-balance principle is extensively discussed by (Coelli, Lauwers and Van 
Huylenbroeck 2007; Lauwers 2009; Welch and Barnum 2009). 
We illustrate graphically on Figure 1, the correspondence between the GHG and cost 
minimization outcome for unit isoquant for the case of two inputs.  The isoquant 
represents a gallon of ethanol produced, the X and Y-axis represent the BTU and KWH 
input of natural gas and electricity respectively.  Point C on the unit isoquant represents a 
cost minimizing point, the tangent line at that point represents the iso-cost line, and the 
line crossing point C represents the all combinations of inputs with GHG emissions equal 
to those at point C.  Likewise we can identify the allocation that results in the plant’s 
minimum GHG emissions, point G, and the isocost line associated with that allocation.  
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Figure 1.1 The correspondence between cost and GHG minimization outcome for unit 
isoquant 
Equations 5 and 6 represent the isocost and iso GHG lines that pass through point C.  
Both are calculated using cost minimizing allocation of the three inputs and two 
byproducts. 
 
CCC PYWXZpweC ),,,(                                                                            (5)   
CCC bYaXGHG                                                                                          (6) 
 Equation 7 and 8 are computed using the GHG minimizing optimal allocation of inputs 
and byproducts. These equations represent the iso cost and iso GHG line that pass 
through point G.   
   
ggg PYWXC                                                                   (7) 
   
ggg bYaXZbaeGHG  ),,,(                                                      (8)   
Iso GHG line with cost minimizing objective 
Iso cost line with GHG minimizing objective 
Iso cost line with cost minimizing objective 
Iso GHG line with GHG minimizing 
objective 
G 
C 
 Elect, KWH 
 N.gas, BTU 
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The iso-GHG line that passes through point C identifies a greater quantity than the 
corresponding line that pass through point G which indicates that producing at cost 
minimizing goal would lead plant to produce more GHG than a plant that produces at 
point G.   
The minimum function above can help us to identify Discrete Shadow price (DSP) 
per gallon of ethanol and Discrete Abatement (DA) of GHG emissions reduction per 
gallon of ethanol respectively 
)/($; gal
e
CC
DSP
Cg 
                                                     (9) 
)/(; galton
e
GHGGHG
DA
MC 
                                                    (10)                      
The ratio of equation 9 over 10 provides an estimate of the discrete cost per ton of GHG 
abatement or shadow price of emissions.  
Efficiency is measured at some particular allocation point.   Each plant has efficiency 
measurements, measured either at their actual allocation, at their minimum cost 
allocation, or at their minimum GHG allocation.  In this article we measure Cost 
Efficiency (CE) as the ratio of minimum cost over the cost when plants were producing at 
GHG minimizing point.  Likewise Environmental Efficiency (EE) is measured as the 
ratio of minimum achievable CO2 at GHG minimizing point over GHG at the cost 
minimizing point. If EE is <1 a particular firm is not environmentally efficient since the 
cost minimizing firm is not minimizing the level of emission in the production process. If   
EE is ≥1 a particular plant is environmentally efficient.  
10 
 
 The above arguments allow us to evaluate whether the particular plant is economically 
and environmentally efficient using our estimated cost and GHG function. A plant is 
environmentally efficient when it chooses the minimum CO2 per gallon of ethanol.  But 
the plant will not likely be cost efficient when it is environmentally efficient.   Obviously 
based on figure 1,  moving along the isoquant from point C to G results in an increase in 
environmental efficiency, but decrease in cost efficiency.   
Empirically, we estimate the minimum value function with a translog specification 
for 3 inputs and 2 byproducts represented in equation 11 using the translog cost 
(Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1971, 1973). 
 
RRRV o  5.0ln                                                    (11) 
Where o  is an intercept,   1X7 first order coefficient parameters and   is 7X7 second 
order coefficient parameters. Where R is natural log of },,,{ zepw . 
The derivative of the translog cost with respect to input and byproduct prices yields the 
cost share of input and byproducts, S: 
 


 RzPwes
r
V
pwr )),,(,(|
ln
ln
),(                                                        (12)    
Where },{ pwr   
We also calculate the Allen partial price elasticities of inputs and byproducts 
based on the translog cost function.  The elasticity estimates are calculated at the mean of 
the prices, and input and byproduct cost share. The appendix section presents the 
mathematical derivation for the above elasticities.  
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1.3 The Data and Estimation Procedure  
 
The article uses data obtained from a survey of seven dry-grind ethanol plants from 
North-central Midwest states (Perrin, Fretes, and Sesmero 2009). The observations are 
quarterly based operating data during 2006 to 2007. The period surveyed began in the 
third quarter of 2006 and lasted until the fourth quarter of 2007 (not all plants were 
observed in all quarters) yielding 34 quarterly observations with a minimum of 3 and 
maximum of 7 quarters of observation per plant. The seven plants produced an average of 
53.1 million gallons of denatured ethanol per year, with a range from 42.5 to 88.1 million 
gallons per year. For this article we calculated actual GHG emissions for each 
observation using emission coefficients obtained from the Biofuel Energy Systems 
Simulator (BESS; www.bess.unl.edu) model that was developed to compare life cycle 
GHG emissions from ethanol production relative to gasoline as a motor fuel, while 
accounting for the dynamic interactions of corn production, ethanol-plant operation, and 
byproduct feeding to livestock (Liska et al. 2009). Byproducts from ethanol plants are 
given a credit for replacing corn as feed in livestock production
2
.  
The econometric procedure of we followed is joint estimation of the cost function and 
the cost share equations using the Zellner's Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
                                                 
2
 All GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels used directly in crop production, 
grain transportation, biorefinery energy use, and byproduct transport are included in the 
BESS model. All upstream GHG emissions with production of fossil fuels, fertilizer 
inputs, and electricity used in the production life cycle are also included (Liska et.al 
2009). 
12 
 
(ITSUR) approach.   Homogeneity and symmetry restriction were maintained
3
. We 
stacked the GHG and cost function together while estimating econometrically. After 
symmetry and homegenity restrictions, with three inputs, two byproducts, one output and 
a fixed variable we have 36 parameters to be estimated.  In the short run, given the 
installed technologies, we assumed that there is no substitution possibility of corn for 
natural gas and electricity. We further assumed own price, output constant demand 
elasticity for corn is zero. These assumptions leave us to estimate a total of 33 
parameters.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Symmetry and equality restrictions imposed across equations to ensure uniqueness of 
estimated parameters which occur in more than one equation.  
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1.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1.1 displays the mean value of observed data per quarter used for our translog 
estimation.   Table 1.2 presents the parameter estimates of equation 11. These parameter 
estimates were used to compute the minimum achievable cost and GHG, optimal level of 
input and byproducts as well as   the shadow price for each plant.  The regularity 
properties of the cost function
4
(monotonicity and curvature) were maintained. Table 1.3 
contains the level and percent change input and byproducts per gallon of ethanol under 
cost and GHG minimizing objective respectively. Whereas table 1.4 provides the change 
in the level of GHG as a result of input and byproduct adjustment made when a plant 
producing at GHG compared to cost minimizing point. The estimated minimum level of 
GHG and cost per gallon of ethanol at GHG and cost minimizing point is also reported in 
table 1.4.  The shadow value of GHG and the cost and environmental efficiency measures 
are presented on table 1.5 through 1.7 respectively.  Table 1.8 shows the Allen partial 
price elasticity of inputs and byproducts evaluated at mean of each predicted share. 
At the cost minimization point, (table 1.3), the average optimal input quantities of 
natural gas, electricity and corn feed stock per gallon of ethanol were 0.05 BTU,  1.71 
KWH and 0.29 bushel respectively.  The average optimal DDG and WDG output levels 
were 4.9 and 1.8 lb per gallon of ethanol.  The corresponding results of the GHG 
minimizing objective for each input and byproducts were depicted on table 1.3. 
                                                 
4
 All estimated shares were monotonic everywhere except eleven data points whereas the 
curvature properties satisfied at each data observation.    
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 The average optimum allocation at GHG minimization point was to produce 47% 
less of dry and 25% more of wet byproduct, with a reduction of natural gas and electricity 
use by 77% and 65 % respectively, albeit corn feedstock use rose 47%.  Moving from 
cost to GHG minimizing point, the average fraction of dried byproduct (the ratio of DDG 
to the total byproduct produced) falls from 0.78 to 0.58 whilst the extra natural gas used 
to dry byproduct fall from 0.0513 to 0.018 MBTU/gal.   Perrin, Fretes, and Sesmero 
(2009) estimated an additional 0.00933MMBTU/gal natural gas needed to dry an 
additional one ton of byproduct, dry matter basis, from 55% moisture (MWDGS) to 10% 
moisture (DDGS.)  It is evident that ethanol-plant energy use and associated GHG 
emissions are affected by fraction of total byproduct dried.   
The average GHG per gallon of ethanol measured across all observations at cost 
minimizing allocations was 10.2 lb whereas at GHG minimizing point was 6.7 lb, (table 
1.4).  This suggests that moving from cost to GHG minimizing goal, on average the plant 
potentially reduced 3.52 lb GHG per gallon of ethanol as portrayed in table 1.4.  The 
average costs at these two allocations from the sample were approximately $1.01/gal and 
$1.24/gal respectively (table 1.4).  
The average shadow prices per quarter ranges from $86 to $190 per ton with average 
value of $124, (table 1.5).  We also found the shadow price as small as $27 and $34 per 
ton for two plans in one quarter which is an indication of the potential room to abate 
GHG emissions with least cost for given level of ethanol. Using the same data but with a 
non-parametric approach, Sesmero, Perrin , and Fulginiti (2010)  on average found  
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$1,726 per ton as the shadow costs associated with moving from GHG minimizing to the 
returns over operating costs maximizing allocations.  
The price of the variable inputs and byproducts considered in this study has changed 
substantially compared to the surveyed year as shown on table 1.1, so also does any given 
estimate of average shadow price.  To capture this change, we ran sensitivity analysis to 
see how the average shadow price changes with updated prices by evaluating at different 
inputs and byproducts price using the parameters shown on table 1.2. When evaluating at 
the mean price of the 2006/07 survey data, the mean shadow price was $119 per ton, 
(table 1.7). However when we updated only the price of corn to the year 2012 value, the 
shadow price increased to $161 per ton. This price fell to $103 when we updated only the 
price of natural gas.  We should note here that the price of corn is doubled whereas the 
price of natural gas fall by nearly 20 percent compared to the price during the 2006/07 
survey. When we further updated both the price of corn and natural gas at the same time, 
we found $167 per ton. The mean shadow prices reached $173 per ton when we 
evaluated after updating all input and byproduct prices. Note that the emission 
coefficients of all inputs and byproducts have not changed from what it was at the 
surveyed year.   
Measured across plants the average environmental efficiency (EE) score is 0.64, 
showing that on average ethanol plant would be able to produce their current ethanol 
output with an input bundle and byproduct combination that contains 36 % less of GHG.  
To do so, on average the total cost of ethanol production would rise by 22 percent.  As 
shown on Table 1.6, to cut emissions, for example by nearly 30 percent,   some plants 
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would raise their cost by 25% albeit for the same level of emission reduction some would 
raise the cost as low as 13%.  Our results also indicated some plants could potentially cut 
their emission level by as much as 50%.   When we updated all prices of inputs and 
byproducts to the year 2012 values, on average plans could reduce emissions by 57 
percent while to do so the cost of ethanol production would rise by 46 percent as depicted 
on Table 1.7. 
Whether distillers grains are dried or sold wet is the key factor that determines the 
ability of a corn ethanol plant to reduce GHG emission since eliminating the need for 
drying of DDGS for corn-ethanol plants can have a significant positive effect on the level 
of natural gas use.    
We present the Allen partial price elasticities calculated from the translog cost 
function in table 1.8.   The diagonal or own price elasticities for all inputs and by 
products are negative which indicates curvature properties actually hold for the price 
estimation. Own price elasticities for natural gas and electricity were inelastic but the 
cross price elasticities of natural gas and electricity revealed complementarity as opposed 
to substitution between them. However, the two byproducts showed substitution in the 
production process which we anticipated given the nature of byproducts production 
process. 
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1.5 Conclusion and Policy Implication 
 
This study develops an analytical framework to explore the tradeoff between 
environmental efficiency and cost efficiency among corn ethanol plants.  The model and 
estimation techniques presented are applicable to a broad range of industries. The study 
also shows a departure from the conventional techniques that treat the undesirable output 
as another variable into the production model. 
Our result indicates that the average plant is able to reduce GHG emissions by 36 
percent relative to the level under cost minimization, but that production costs will be 
then 22 percent higher than the minimum possible. The reallocations responsible for 
these emissions reductions are primarily the substitution of wet for dry distillers grains, 
with the corresponding reduction in the use of natural gas and electricity. Our findings 
revealed that on average ethanol plants would produce 25 % more of wet byproduct and 
47% less of dry byproduct.  
Comparing results across observations, the estimated shadow price for emissions 
reduction ranges from $86 to $190 per ton of CO2 with average value of $124 per ton. 
The study also found that there was considerable heterogeneity among the corn ethanol 
plants in the level of emissions reduction and abatement cost per gallon of ethanol.  The 
variation of GHG reductions and abatement costs per gallon of ethanol across plant 
results from different in relative prices and variations in plant configurations even though 
all plants were constructed at approximately the same time and share the same basic 
technology, whilst the heterogeneity reflects the presence of potential room for the plant 
improvement in reducing GHG. 
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When abatement programs based on market incentives exist, as is proposed by 
California’s LCFS, the implied shadow price of GHG can be used as a bench mark for 
pollution trading and serves to assess the effectiveness of existing regulation. Imposing a 
new regulatory requirement over biofuel would likely cause a shift in ethanol markets 
that favors plants that mitigate GHG.  
With regard to corn ethanol plants our findings would provide valuable information to 
the industry in its efforts to comply with upcoming regulations, and to policy makers who 
must consider the CO2 abatement costs of the corn ethanol system. The analysis 
presented here shows the level of GHG reduction and the shadow prices among ethanol 
plants are considerably dependent on the value of emission coefficients of inputs and by 
products obtained from BESS.   
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I. Table of Results  
 
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Estimation: all are per quarter basis 
Variables Unit 
Mean 
price 
2006-2007 
a
Mean 
price 
2012 
Units of 
input & 
byproduct 
Mean quantity 
of input & 
byproduct 
Emission 
coefficient 
Corn $/Bu 3.014 6.13 Bu/gal 0.349 0.00668 
N.gas $/MBTU 7.292 5.96 MBTU/gal 0.026 0.06302 
Electricity $/KWH 0.044 0.061 KWH/gal 0.570 0.00074 
DDG $/ton 93.69 202.29 lb/gal 3.438 -0.4198 
WDG $/ton 60.24 83.12 lb/gal 2.071 -0.4079 
Other cost million $ 3.576  $/gal 0.262 - 
Ethanol $/gal 2.051  Mill gallon 13.64 0.032 
Total cost million $ 14.15  
   Total GHG tons 44,628  
   Note:
a
 All prices are weighted average from  seven studied states  for month of January 
and February. Natural gas and electricity prices represent average industrial price from 
US Energy Information Administrative Agency.  Corn price is obtained from 
USDA/NASS quick stat. The price of DDG is a 10% moisture basis whereas WDG is a 
weighted average of 55-60% and 60-70 % moisture basis, and both data are from USDA 
Agricultural Marketing services. 
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Table 1.2 Parameter Estimates of the Translog Function 
Parameter
 
Value Parameter
 
Value 
C  
0.160 
(0.092) 
DW  
0.063*** 
(0.017) 
N  
0.144 
(0.093) 
WW  
  -0.080*** 
(0.020) 
E  
   0.171*** 
(0.026) CY  
  0.276*** 
(0.030) 
D  
-0.337** 
(0.112) 
NY  0.012 
(0.025) 
W  
0.862*** 
(0.116) 
EY  0.020** 
(0.006) 
Y  
2.005* 
(0.834) 
DY  0.093* 
(0.037) 
Z  
0.126 
(0.707) 
WY    -0.402*** 
(0.042) 
CD  
-0.031** 
(0.010) CZ  
-0.015 
(0.034) 
CW  
0.031** 
(0.010) 
NZ  0.048 
(0.040) 
NN  
0.047*** 
(0.013) 
EZ  -0.005 
(0.011) 
NE  
- 0.031*** 
(0.005) 
DZ     0.144*** 
(0.032) 
ND  
-0.006 
(0.012) 
WZ    0.115** 
(0.035) 
NW  
-0.010 
(0.013) 
YY  -0.131 
(0.234) 
EE  
0.030 
(0.002) 
YZ  0.346 
(0.289) 
ED  
0.004 
(0.004) 
ZZ  -0.725** 
(0.279) 
EW  
-0.003 
(0.004) 
O  
   10.851*** 
(1.409) 
DD  
-0.030 
(0.022)   
Note: Legend: *, **  & ***  significant at  1, 5 and  10%   respectively. The standard 
error is in the bracket. Whereas C=Corn, N=Natural gas, E=Electricity, D=DDG, 
W=WDG, Z=other cost, Y=ethanol output  
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Table 1.3 Average Level of Input and Byproducts per gallon of Ethanol Under two 
Objectives 
Objective 
Corn, 
Bu/gal 
N gas, 
MBTU/gal 
Electricity, 
KWH/gal 
DDG, 
lb/gal 
WDG, 
lb/gal 
Ethanol, 
mill gal 
Cost minimizing 0.291 0.0518 1.708 4.89 1.76 13.64 
GHG minimizing 0.429 0.0183 0.391 2.59 2.20 13.64 
% change from cost to 
GHG minimization 47% -65% -77% -47% 25% -36% 
 
 
Table 1.4 GHG and Cost Reduction per gallon of Ethanol by Plant per quarter 
Ethanol 
plant, Mil 
gal/quarter 
Cost 
minimizing 
lb/gal 
GHG 
minimizing, 
lb/gal 
Difference 
from Cost to 
GHG,   lb/gal 
Cost 
minimizing 
$/gal 
GHG 
minimizing 
$/gal 
Difference 
from Cost to 
GHG, $/gal 
11.93 9.97 6.93 3.04 1.17 1.46 0.29 
11.97 9.92 6.69 3.23 1.08 1.25 0.17 
13.09 9.63 6.75 2.88 1.05 1.19 0.14 
13.14 11.49 6.80 4.69 1.10 1.44 0.34 
13.15 9.27 6.77 2.51 0.87 1.06 0.18 
13.34 10.04 6.65 3.39 0.82 1.01 0.19 
22.03 11.82 5.91 5.91 1.04 1.42 0.37 
Average 10.20 6.68 3.52 1.01 1.24 0.23 
1 t(US) = 2000 lb. The last column “Difference from Cost to GHG, $/gal” is in absolute 
value    
 
Table 1.5 Shadow Price ($/ton) CO2 equivalent by Plant per quarter 
# Quarters 
observed 
Ethanol,  
Mill gallon  
Mean, 
$/ton 
Std Dev, 
$/ton 
Min, 
$/ton 
Max, 
$/ton 
4 11.93 190 20 172 217 
5 11.97 86 49 27 128 
6 13.09 90 34 34 120 
5 13.14 146 21 125 175 
5 13.15 145 48 84 189 
6 13.34 106 32 66 152 
3 22.03 126 6 119 131 
Average 13.64 124 46 27 217 
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Table 1.6 Cost and Environmental Efficiency Measure per quarter 
# Quarter 
observed 
Ethanol, 
mil gal 
Cost 
efficiency 
Environmental 
efficiency 
4 11.93 1.25 0.69 
5 11.97 1.14 0.68 
6 13.09 1.13 0.70 
5 13.14 1.31 0.59 
5 13.15 1.22 0.73 
6 13.34 1.22 0.66 
3 22.03 1.36 0.50 
Average 13.64 1.22 0.64 
 
 
Table 1.7 Sensitivity of average GHG shadow price to updated (2012) prices 
  
2006-07 
survey prices 
only corn price 
updated 
only N.gas 
price updated 
Corn &N.gas 
price updated 
all prices 
updated 
Shadow price, $/ton 119 161 103 167 173 
Environmental 
efficiency 0.66 0.45 0.60 0.41 0.43 
Cost efficiency 1.20 1.35 1.23 1.45 1.46 
 
 
Table 1.8 Allen Partial Price Elasticity Evaluated at Mean Prices and Shares for the 
Translog Net Cost Function 
 
Price of 
Quantity of Corn N.gas Electricity DDG WDG 
Corn 
   
-0.258 -0.016 
N.gas 
 
-0.507 -0.017 -0.237 -0.081 
Electricity 
 
-0.089 -0.503 -0.157 -0.093 
DDG 0.703 0.337 0.090 -1.358 0.229 
WDG 1.425 0.170 0.017 0.955 -2.567 
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Appendix 1 
 
I.The price elasticity of demand for factors of production: 
1.Own price elasticities of input are calculated as 
i
iiii
ii
S
SS 

2
   
2.Cross price elasticities among inputs 
i
jiij
ij
S
SS


  
3.Cross price elasticities between inputs and by products 
x
i
ijy
jij
S
S

 
 
II. The price elasticity of demand for by products: 
2.1 Own price elasticities between by product 1

i
ii
iii
S
S


 
2.2 Cross price elasticities between by products  
i
ij
jij
S
S

 
 
2.3 Cross price elasticities between by products and input  
y
i
ijx
jij
S
S

 
 
  represents the vector of second order parameters  from the translog estimation. ij  
show a cross price coefficient among  inputs, DDG and WDG. iS  represent the mean 
predicted share of each input and byproduct. xjS  and 
y
jS  used to differentiate the share of 
input from  byproduct respectively while calculating  cross price elasticity . 
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Federal Tax Credit and Mandate on 
                   Ethanol Market 
 
  Abstract  
Using a multi-output, multi-input partial equilibrium model this article examines the 
likely impact of changes in the ethanol tax credit and mandate policies on ethanol, 
byproduct and corn markets. This partial equilibrium analysis is built upon an empirical 
industry level cost function for corn ethanol plants with two byproducts: dried distillers 
grain with soluble and wet distillers grain with soluble.   
In the short-run, without the tax credit, ethanol plants will not have the incentive  to 
produce the minimum level of ethanol required by renewable fuel standard (RFS2) 
mandate. In the long-run, for ethanol plants to have the incentive to produce the 
minimum RFS2 requirement without tax credit policy, gasoline price will need to 
increase by order of 50% or more. Without renewing the tax credit, however RFS2 
mandate estimated to raise ethanol price to $2.81 per gallon in the short run, and in the 
long-run to $2.63.  
Producing the RFS2 mandate level of ethanol without tax credit will also push the short 
and long run price of corn to $6.90 and $6.60 per bushel respectively compared to $6.07 
per bushel without any ethanol policies. 
Our estimates of the effects of ethanol tax credit and mandate on quantity and price of 
ethanol, byproducts, corn and other inputs are sensitive to assumptions about the ethanol 
demand elasticity and price of gasoline. 
Key words: ethanol, corn, tax credit and mandate 
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2.1 Introduction  
 
 The US congress ended the federal tax credit and tariff for ethanol at the end of 
2011, winding up more than three decades of federal government subsidies given for 
production and consumption of ethanol. However some congressional members are still 
contemplating to renew the tax credit and revise the existing mandate amid  growing 
pressure for the development of green energy based economy. The government has been 
subsidizing biofuels industry primarily through: the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax 
Credit (VEETC - tax credit to refiners blending ethanol with gasoline), the Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS1 & RFS2)
5
, and an import tariff.   
The provision of the biofuel subsidies has been justified because they reduce 
dependence on imported foreign oil, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and support rural 
farm income. The objective of VEETC and RFS mandate specifically is to encourage 
biofuels in greater quantity than either would without the policies. Whereas the import 
tariff was set to foster the competitiveness of domestic corn ethanol producers by giving a 
cost advantage over imported Brazilian sugarcane ethanol.   
The above policies have actually spurred ethanol production, primarily ethanol 
from corn starch to grow from about 2 billion gallons in 2002 to nearly 14 billion gallons 
in 2011 and for the first time US become a net exporter of ethanol in the year 2010 (RFA, 
                                                 
5
 The Congressionally mandated RFS2 goal is to use at least 36 billion gallons of bio-
based transportation fuels by 2022; 15 billion gallons can come from conventional 
biofuel sources such as corn starch based ethanol.  Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) analysis indicates that ethanol from corn has been capped at 15 billion gallons in 
year 2015 and beyond. 
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2011).   However in 2011 alone the cost of VEETC for conventional corn starch ethanol 
to the Treasury in forgone revenues was more than $6 billion. Had it not expired this cost 
could grow close to $7 billion in 2015 and each year thereafter under the assumption that 
the RFS2 is fully met. Under the current market condition, the tax credit and RFS are 
duplicative policy tools and the tax credit has no impact on ethanol production or 
consumption (Babcock 2010; GAO 2009, Tyner, Taheripour, and Perkis 2010) unless a 
new discretionary ethanol requirement is set. 
 One of the criticisms that under current market condition is the  justification of  
extending the tax credit and mandate so long as the demand for ethanol and gasoline 
remains strong and production of ethanol from corn is becoming a mature technology.  
The facets of this topic have been the subject of a great deal of research and policy debate 
continues on over the efficacy of biofuel policy. The ethanol tax credit and tariff are now 
gone. It is nonetheless useful to analyze the possible market impacts of ethanol policies in 
order to give valuable information to the ethanol industry, fuel consumers and policy 
makers to know the future market directions of ethanol. 
The purpose of this article is thus to explore the primary impact of the tax credit 
and RFS mandate on the 2015 expected market price of ethanol, byproducts, corn, energy 
and other factor inputs employed in the production of corn ethanol.  The text also 
explores the distributional implication of these ethanol policies to ethanol producer and 
consumer as well as tax payers. The paper also seeks to offer additional contribution in 
providing perspective on ethanol byproduct markets under new alternative ethanol 
policies. 
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 The approach taken is a multi-output, multi-input partial equilibrium market 
model. This equilibrium analysis is built upon an empirical industry level cost function 
for the corn based ethanol industry with two byproducts- dried distillers grain and 
solubles (DDG) and wet distillers grain with solubles (WDG). The model comprises three 
outputs: ethanol, DDG and WDG, four variable inputs (corn, natural gas, electricity, 
labor and other), and one fixed input, aggregate plant and equipment. 
The rest of this article is organized as follow: section 2 presents brief overview of 
the economics of ethanol from which we developed our theoretical model. Subsection 
two is devoted to explain the analytical model. The data and model calibration procedure 
displayed in section three. Results with detailed discussion are presented in section 4 and 
the final portion wrap up with the conclusion and implication of the article.   
 
2.2 Theoretical Model 
2.2.1 The Economics of Ethanol  
 
Under competitive market condition the price of ethanol is determined by market 
supply and demand interaction. However the presence of multiple government subsidy 
policies such as VEETC, RFS and excise tax has affected the price, supply and the 
demand for ethanol. The demand for ethanol is largely  derived from the gasoline demand 
and has gotten some of its value for its energy content as a fuel substitute, additive value 
as oxygenate fuel use and   octane enhancer (Babcock, Barr and  Carriquiry 2010;De 
Gorter and Just 2008; Miranowski 2007; Tyner, Taheripour, and Perkis  2010).   
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Considering only the domestic ethanol industry, the demand curve for ethanol D 
in Figure 2.1 reflects the value that blenders/ fuel refiners place on different volumes of 
ethanol-the demand for ethanol represents the blender’s derived demand. The supply 
curve Ss represents the shortrun domestic supply of ethanol in US. Sl represents the 
longrun ethanol supply curve.  
 
 
                   
                      
         
                              
        
          
                                                                                             
              
           
    
                                                
    
                                                         
                        
 
 
Figure 2.1 Illustration of the supply and demand curves of ethanol 
 
The RFS2 mandate is an established floor level of consumption requiring 
blending of specified amount of ethanol annually into U.S. transportation fuels. The 2012 
requirement under RFS2 is 13.2 billion gallons. The RFS objective is to force blenders to 
use more biofuels than they would without the mandate, whereas the VEETC support 
discretionary blending above and beyond the market levels (Babcock, Barr and 
Carriquiry 2010; GOA 2009; Tyner, Taheripour, and Perkis 2010).    
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With already installed capacity, without any government subsidy provision the 
initial short and longrun market equilibrium price and quantity of   ethanol are  Q and 
*P  respectively, point c on figure 2.1.  However, for example, with the tax credit and 
RFS mandate put in place, in the short run ethanol production would go to and beyond 
the mandated quantity level, tmsQ
 . At tmsQ
 , ethanol producers are willing to supply at 
price pP  ,  whereas blenders’ willingness to pay price bsP  otherwise they are not willing 
to blend the required amount of ethanol.  The same argument holds in the long-run 
period. The market equilibrium point, point C, represents an underlying short and long-
run equilibrium.  
RFS2 mandate is binding if and only if the required amount of ethanol exceeded 
what is offered by the market, otherwise the mandate is  non-binding.  Therefore tmsQ
  
   
become a non-binding mandate if the required mandated RFS2 is surpassed by the market 
level that is being produced. mlQ  represents the year 2015 and beyond  level of ethanol 
production that could be produced with  effective capacity of the ethanol plants ( the sum 
of the capacity currently operating  and plant under construction). At mlQ , plants are 
assumed  to supply a gallon of ethanol at a price, pP  but fuel refiners are  willing to pay 
only 
b
l
P . This creates a wedge of ‘de’ size as shown on figure 2.1. We find point ‘e’ 
based on the differences between quantity of ethanol obtained at capacity and the actual 
production at  point tmsQ
  , price *P  and elasticity of ethanol demand. The size of ‘ab’ is 
the $0.45 per gallon ethanol tax credit. Removing the two wedges ‘ab’ and ‘de’ using 
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comparative statistics gives us the underlying short and long run market equilibrium point 
‘C’.  The above figure illustrates how we reached to the market equilibrium point based 
on the demand and supply curves. The model calibration section exposits numerically 
how we reached this market equilibrium point. 
 Byproducts
6
 from corn ethanol plants represent a key component of total 
industry’s revenue, and in 2011 alone about 16% of a corn based dry milling ethanol 
plant’s revenue comes from DGS sales (RFA, 2011).  Recently with ever increasing corn 
and soybean prices and strong growth in DGS availability, the DGS market orientation 
has changed the landscape of domestic livestock feed ration and hence DGS became a 
partial substitute in many livestock and poultry rations for feed grains and soybean meal 
(Jones et.al 2007; Westcott  2007; Klopfenstein, Erickson, and Bremer  2008).  
Any ethanol policy intervention would certainly affect the price and quantity level 
of the two byproducts. The analytical model section captures the two byproducts in our 
displacement model. In most previous biofuel economic studies DGS has   often been 
incorporated in an adhoc fashion. Hence it is imperative to see the impact of various 
ethanol policies on byproducts market since DGS production changes along with  ethanol 
production while their price track the price of both corn and soybean meal.  Few studies 
                                                 
6
 For ease of exposition DGS represents both DDG and WDG from corn ethanol plant. 
The major by-product feeds from current corn-based ethanol are corn gluten feed and 
corn germ meal from wet-mill ethanol plants, and distiller’s grains from dry- grind 
ethanol plant. Distiller’s grains from dry-mill ethanol plants: Dried Distillers Grain  (10% 
mmoisture), Modified Wet Distillers Grain (50-55% moisture) , Wet Distillers Grain (65-
70% Moisture), distillers’ dried grains with soluble (DDGS), and condensed distillers’ 
soluble (CDS).  A bushel of corn processed into ethanol by dry mills produces 
approximately 17.5 pounds of distillers’ spent grains (RFA 2012;Hoffman and Baker, 
2010).  
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(Babcock 2007;Beckman, Keeny and Tyner 2011; Taheripour et.al 2010; Tokgoz et 
al.2007, Tyner and Taheripour 2007) have included DGS into their partial equilibrium 
models to evaluate the economic impacts of biofuel production and only few  of these 
studies explicitly distinguish wet and dry in the  manner of this article. It is crucial to 
model the byproducts separately to get an improved understanding of the byproducts 
market with the changing biofuel policies.  
 Overall our modeling approach has two principal advantages over the past 
studies: first our model comprises four factor inputs and fixed capital needed to produce 
ethanol.  This allows measuring the impact of ethanol policies not only in corn market but 
also in natural gas and electricity market as opposed to many of the past studies that 
focused only in corn market. Secondly we explicitly modeled the byproducts as 
disaggregated into dry and wet to measure the consumer surplus in both byproduct 
markets.   
2.2.2 The Equilibrium Displacement Model 
 
We assume there is N number of ethanol plants producing a homogeneous ethanol 
and byproducts. The production technology of this ethanol industry is represented with 
dual cost function ),( WYC , where Y  is an 3x1 vector of outputs (ethanol, DDG and 
WDG)  and W is 5x1 vector of four variable  inputs ( corn, natural gas, electricity, labor 
and other)  and one fixed input ( aggregate plant and equipment).  Outputs are sold at a 
corresponding vector of prices, P .    
The demand for ethanol and byproducts output is represented as; 
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)( dd PfY                                  (1) 
Where P
d 
represents a vector of 3x1 demand prices of ethanol, DDG and WDG.  The 
demand for ethanol reflects the value that blenders place on different volumes of ethanol 
whereas DGS demand reflects livestock producers’ value for dry and wet byproducts. We 
further assume that the ethanol industry operates under perfect competition and 
production technology of the representative firm in the industry represented by constant 
returns to scale. An initial zero-profit equilibrium in product and factor markets also 
considered. Hence ),( WYC  represents the industry-level joint cost function and this cost 
function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, concave and nondecreasing 
in input price. It is also homogenous of degree one with input prices and outputs. 
Market clearing condition on equation 2 represents the long run equilibrium 
condition that marginal cost of each output is equal to domestic prices for respective 
outputs.  
 
SP
Y
WYC


 ),(
                                                                                             (2) 
Where SP  is the vector of supply price of ethanol and DGS. 
Using Shephard's lemma, optimal factor demand can be obtained using equation 3. 
),(
),(
WYX
W
WYC



                                         (3) 
 Equation 3 represents the derived demand for input X  in the production of  a given 
levels of ethanol and DGS.   
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 Factor supply or the joint output is given by Equation 4 and it is a function of input 
prices. 
 
)(WgX                                 (4) 
 Ethanol price wedges due to ethanol tax credit to blenders represented as   
 
d
S
P
P
1
1  =1+                                                                            (5a) 
Where SP1  represents per gallon ethanol producers price and 
d
P1  is the per gallon price of 
ethanol that blenders pay.   
 is the wedge on the price of ethanol between what blenders pay and ethanol producers 
receive  This wedge is measured as a percentage of the initial equilibrium price of 
ethanol,  and is considered an exogenous policy variable, in our case it is the per gallon 
amount of tax credit.   
 The ethanol consumption mandate will also create an output wedge between what the 
ethanol pans willing to produce and fuel refiners willing to blend with prevailing market 
prices. Mathematically this is shown in equation 5b below: 
 
1
*
1
1
Y
Y m
                 (5b) 
Where,  mY
1
 is the 2015 and beyond minimum level of ethanol quantity consumption, i.e.,  
15 billion gallons of corn ethanol. Whereas  *1Y  is the short and long run market 
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equilibrium quantity level which actually corresponds to *Q  on figure 2.1 above.   is 
the wedge that captures the percentage change in the quantity of ethanol to reach to the  
mandated level. 
The current technological structure of the US ethanol industry is adapted and 
some of the elasticies are econometrically estimated from a recent survey of Midwest 
ethanol plants (Perrin, Fretes and Sesmero 2009). Our model treats the U.S. ethanol 
economy as being closed to international ethanol trade.  
Derivatives of the cost function could be expressed in terms of various elasticities 
and share parameters. Totally differentiating equations 1 through 5 and converting them 
into elasticity form, yields system of logarithmic differential equation, from 6 through 11, 
expressed in terms of relative changes and elasticities.   
dPdYd lnln                                             (6) 
 Where  is a 3x3  price elasticity of demand for ethanol and DGS  
 
 
sd
WPYP
PdWdYd
dss
lnlnln                                          (7) 
Where 
YPs
  and dsWP  
represent 3X3 and 3 X 5 matrices of output supply elasticities and 
marginal cost elasticities with respect to input price .  The mathematical detail for how 
we calculated the elasticities is presented in the mathematical footnotes in appendix 2. 
 
XdWdYd d
XWXY
lnlnln                                           (8) 
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Where XW  is a 5X5 output-constant derived demand elasticity matrix and XY  is a 5 by 3 
elasticity of demand for input X with respect to output Y. Elasticity of input with respect 
to output is equal to unit Y under constant return to scale.  
A factor supply function in elasticity forms gives us: 
sWdXd lnln                                                                        (9) 
where   is a 5 by 5 excess factor  supply elasticity matrix. Since there is no wedge 
between price of input demand and supply, the following relationship holds sW = dW = 
W  
the tax credit and mandate wedges in the percentage form from equation 5a and 5b are 
converted into the following forms : 
 
dPdPd ds  lnln                            (10)  
dYdYd  *11 lnln                   (11) 
The above equations are solved to evaluate the changes in market outputs and 
inputs price and quantity that would occur under different ethanol policies.  The 
equilibrium displacement model framework of this portion is taken from Perrin (2009). 
The welfare gains and loss in each market are also calculated in the usual manner via as a 
change in producer surpluses, consumer surpluses, and government tax revenue. 
 
 
 
38 
 
2.3 Model Calibration 
 
We first seek market equilibrium outcomes by parameterizing the corn ethanol 
demand and supply curves for the year 2015. This market equilibrium point, we call it a 
baseline (or status quo), is the situation in which no tax credit and mandate policies 
against which we simulate the impact of renewing the tax credit, and RFS2 mandate 
policy both in the short and long-run, point C on figure 2.1. We summarize how we 
reached the  long run market equilibrium outcome as follow: we first assume constant 
elasticity supply and demand curves for corn ethanol, and calibrated to fit 2011 data. 
These supply and demand curves are assumed to be linear. We again assumed that the 
effective capacity of corn ethanol production in 2015 will be about 14.25 billion gallons 
(existing capacity plus capacity of plants under construction).  We further assume that in 
2015 plant is willing to supply a gallon of ethanol at wholesale price that prevailed in 
year 2011. We take the year 2011 producer price of ethanol as the average wholesale 
FOB price for Midwest, $2.55 per gallon.  We computed the price that blenders willing to 
pay for a gallon of ethanol based on the 2011 price of ethanol, 2015 quantity supply of 
ethanol at the capacity, and the demand elasticity of ethanol
7
.  Finally using the 
comparative statistic we estimated our base model (or status quo), i.e., the market 
equilibrium outcomes, by removing the wedge between  per gallon price that ethanol 
producers willing to sell and fuel refiners willing to buy.  This market equilibrium point, 
                                                 
7
  The formal equation used is :
dpdYd lnln  , where   is price elasticity of ethanol 
demand.  
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Point C on figure 2.1, represents the short and long run market equilibrium point. The 
fact that our base configuration is based on the year 2011 data, using comparative 
statistics  removing the $045 per gallon of ethanol tax credit that was active in year 2011, 
will give us the short-run market equilibrium outcomes. 
With respect to byproduct market, throughout the analysis we assumed both DDG 
and WDG have constant demand and supply curves. The supply elasticity of DDG and 
WDG are econometrically estimated based on a translog cost function we built on chapter 
1. Moreover, the derived demand elasticities of corn, natural gas and electricity are also 
econometrically estimated using a translog cost function. We also calculated excess 
factor supply elasticity for all input considered
8
. Where there is no complete information 
for the remaining elasticity of inputs, the article uses information from related studies and 
configured these elasticities in a manner consistent with our model. Details of the 
elasticity figures and the value of other relevant parameters are presented from table 2.1 
through 2.6.   
Key assumptions made were that ethanol and the two byproducts quantity is the 
domestically produced in the US with no imports.  We also assume that the demand curve 
for ethanol shifts out by due to a change in the wholesale premium gasoline price at the 
rack. To determine the size of the shift in ethanol demand,  we assumed that ethanol 
serves as an imperfect substitute to gasoline in US market. To invoke this shift in ethanol 
demand, we used cross demand elasticity of ethanol with respect to gasoline price 1.056 
as estimated by Miranowski (2007).   
                                                 
8
 The mathematical appendix section shows how we computed the excess supply 
elasticity.   
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The short and long run corn ethanol supply elasticities used are 0.65 and 0.25 
based on Elobeid & Tokgoz (2008), and Miranowski (2007) respectively. Whereas the 
short and long run corn demand elasticities for corn ethanol are -0.89 and -2.9 obtained 
from Miranowski (2007) and Luchansky & Monks (2009) respectively. The remaining 
elasticities for factor input and byproducts are listed on the parameters and values 
description section at the end of the text. The short-run and long-run periods for all inputs 
and outputs are differentiated based on types of demand and supply elasticity curves used 
in the model. 
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 We simulate the impact of extending tax credit and mandate from the short and 
long-run market equilibrium point we described above.  The two scenarios we built from 
our baseline outcome are: 
(1) Extending tax credit, i.e., $0.45 per gallon to ethanol blenders/refiners  
(2) Mandate , enforcing producers to produce the  minimum level of ethanol required by 
RFS2 
In order to investigate the sensitivity of price and quantity of ethanol as well as 
byproducts and all inputs to ranges of gasoline price at the rack, we run sensitivity 
analysis based on a possible percent increase in wholesale premium gasoline price from 
the base year to the anticipated short and long run period. In the base model, we take 
$3.18 per gallon average wholesale rack price of premium gasoline. 
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We ran the above scenarios each time for both short and long run period.  The 
wide range of parameter values of demand and supply elasticity for ethanol and factor 
inputs shown from table 1A through 1f suggests that the outcomes of the different policy 
scenarios of depend on these parameters. 
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2.5 Empirical Result 
 
The results of the ethanol policy simulations are summarized in tables 2.7 through 
2.13.  The results in table 2.7 through 2.9 contain the short and long-run market prices 
and quantities changes in output markets in combination with changes in some key 
assumptions. Table 2.10 and 2.11 shows the results of the welfare changes, i.e. change in 
consumer and producer surplus as a percent of initial value from the baseline outcome 
when the new alternative policies prevail in the ethanol, byproduct and factor markets. 
Table 2.12 and 2.13 contain the change on natural gas and electricity factor market price 
and quantities.     
                                                                                           
2.5.1 The Market Effects of Ethanol without Tax credit and Mandate 
 
We first summarized the baseline short and long-run market equilibrium 
outcomes for all outputs and inputs considered in this model. Thus the long-run market 
equilibrium quantity of ethanol for 2015 estimated to be is 12.16 billion gallon, a 9% fall 
from the base quantity level. The per gallon market equilibrium price of ethanol  is $2.39, 
a 6 % fall to the ethanol producer and 17 %  rise to the ethanol refiners compared to what 
they were getting  in the base configuration.  Since the production of both byproducts 
trail along with the level of ethanol production, any change in quantity of ethanol 
production certainly affect the prices and quantity supply of both byproducts. At the 
estimated market equilibrium, corn price is $6.07 per bushel. The above results are 
presented on the second column of table 2.7. We now start to seek the market outcomes 
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of the impact of extending the $0.45 per gallon tax credit to ethanol blenders, enforcing 
RFS2 mandate of 15 billion gallon of ethanol from year 2015 and beyond. We also ran a 
sensitivity analysis to see the impact of gasoline price on the market outcomes of price 
and quantity of ethanol and other key variables. 
2.5.2 The Short-run Market Effects of Ethanol Tax credit and Mandate  
 
In the short run with the extension of the tax credit, ethanol production will reach 
an estimated 13.24 billion gallon per year (bgy), 9% increase from market equilibrium 
outcome.  Ethanol producers are willing to supply this for $2.60 whereas refiners willing 
to buy for $2.15 per gallon which shows the $0.45 per gallon tax credit to be distributed 
almost equally.  Under the mandate of 15 bgy, the price that ethanol producer willing to 
supply will be $2.94 per gallon while ethanol refiners buy at $1.76. The outcome from 
this mandate is a $1.20 per gallon price wedge between what producers would be willing 
to supply and what fuel blenders willing to pay voluntarily. The detail of the results are 
shown on table 2.7. 
We injected a 10% change on gasoline price in our equlibruim market outcome 
and computed the impact of this price change on the markets for ethanol and associated 
products, with and without tax credit and mandate policy scenario. While without tax 
credit and mandate, the 10% change in gasoline price alone will induce an additional 0.68 
billion gallons of ethanol and $0.13 per gallon raise on the price that ethanol producer use 
to supply and fuel refiners used to buy as shown on table 2.7.  While producing at the 
RFS2 minimum mandate level, the 10% change on gasoline price will drive down the 
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producer price of ethanol to $2.81 per gallon, shrinking the wedge between producer and 
refiners to $0.77 per gallon compared to without gasoline price shock.  
We can argue that had the tax credit been extended and again at the same time 
there would be a 10 % change in gasoline price, the overall ethanol production would 
increase close to 14 bgy, i.e., by adding up the additional gain of 0.68 bgy from a 10% 
gasoline price effect on the final quantity of ethanol we obtained with the tax credit.   
Technically we can obtain 14 billion gallon of ethanol, close to the RFS2 mandated level, 
with $0.45 per gallon subsidy.   
In this segment, for ease of exposition among four of the policy simulations result 
on the byproducts market (table 2.7), we only discuss the market outcomes that we 
obtained without tax credit and mandate policy with the combination of the impact of a 
change on premium gasoline price. With the tax credit, the equilibrium quantities of 
DDG rise almost by 1.24 mmt (7.4%) while its price falls by $13 per ton (6%) compared 
with the longrun equilibrium market outcomes.  Likewise production of WDG will rise 
by 1.1 mmt (8.5%) and its price fall by $11 per ton (9%). Without the tax credit and 
mandate policy, a 10% increase in gasoline price alone induced almost a 6% increase in 
ethanol supply which eventually would increase the supply of both byproducts. This 
change in ethanol supply actually resulted in an additional 0.8 and 0.7 mmt of DDG and 
WDG respectively while their per ton price fell by about $7 as shown on table 2.  
Changing the price of gasoline while producing at mandated level of ethanol will not bear 
any change on the quantity and price of both byproducts from what we obtained without 
change in premium gasoline price.  
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In factor market, all factor input will change linearly and proportionally with the 
percentage change in quantity of ethanol in both policy interventions we analyzed. A 
particular market that deserves attention is a corn market since as high as 40 percent of 
domestically produced corn goes to ethanol production and the cost of corn in the total 
operating cost of ethanol is nearly 72%.  Extending tax credit will in short-run stimulate 
the demand for corn by 9%, that will lead the overall corn demand for the year to reach to 
4.8 billion bushel while price of corn will increase to $6.4 per bushel (5.4%). Whereas 
without any policy interventions, a 10% change in gasoline price alone resulted in an 
additional quarter billion bushel of corn demand and $0.20 per bushel price differential 
from the equilibrium outcomes. Therefore the demand for corn would go up about 5 
billion bushel and per bushel price will rise to $6.6, if we were certain of the tax credit 
and a 10% increase in premium gasoline. Ethanol plant would demand about 5.4 billion 
of bushels to produce at the mandate level and this pushes the price of corn upward to 
$6.90 per bushel as shown on table 2.7. Overall the price of corn will increase by 5 to 14 
% in all of the policy simulations we ran.   
Returns to the owners of the capital will increase by 12% if the tax credit is 
implemented while with binding mandate this increase would be around 31 % compared 
with the market equilibrium outcome without any interventions. With respect to the 
energy market, the change in the price of both electricity and natural gas was 
insignificant, i.e., less than one percent as presented on table 2.11.   
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2.5.3 The Long-run Market Effects of Ethanol Tax credit and Mandate  
 
In this section we reran the same policy analysis but using long-run elasticities of 
demand and supply curves. Extending the tax credit will actually spur greater production 
of ethanol, 15.11 billion of gallons, surpassing slightly the 15 bgy mandate, (table 2.8). 
Ethanol producers will sell for $2.64 while blenders could be willing to pay $2.19 per 
gallon, an 11% raise and 9% fall respectively compared with the base market equilibrium 
price of $2.39. While with mandate policy scenario, it is quite interesting to see that both 
prices would change the same as with the tax credit. It turn out that the outcomes  leave 
the wedge between these two prices almost equal to the $0.45 per gallon tax credit and 
much less than a $1.20 price wedge we obtained with the same (mandate) scenario in the 
short-run.  Without any tax credit and mandate, a 10% increase in gasoline price will 
result only an additional 0.57 billion gallon ethanol and a nickel per gallon price change. 
With a combination of mandate and a 10% increase on gasoline price change, however, 
the price producer receive will not change but refiners would be willing to   pay almost 
$0.10 higher. 
 We further ran a sensitivity analysis with 50 and 60 % change in the price of 
premium gasoline compared to the base line price, results on table 2.8 and 2.9.  The 
impact of 50% change would result exactly the same quantity and price change for 
outputs and inputs except ethanol producer price  as obtained with the mandate outcome 
as shown  on table 2.8, column 2.  The implication of this outcome is that the amount of 
ethanol produced would just be equivalent to the required mandate but the price wedge 
created between ethanol producers and refiner because of mandate policy will vanish.  
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 We further increased the change in gasoline price to 60% to see price and 
quantity impact across producer and consumer.  Without tax credit and mandate policy, 
ethanol production would reach 15.6 bgy, i.e., an additional 3.4 billion gallon and $0.30 
per gallon change from market equilibrium table 2.8.  However had it been with tax 
credit extended, ethanol production would have been 18.5 billion gallon and per gallon 
price would $2.93 and $2.48 to ethanol producer and refiners respectively.  Ethanol 
producer willing to supply the required minimum mandate level of ethanol with $2.63 per 
gallon irrespective of the change in price of premium gasoline but ethanol refiners would   
pay more as the price of gasoline goes up and eventually would willing to pay higher than 
that the ethanol producers willingness to supply, as shown on the last column of table 2.8. 
The mandate by itself will increase the price of ethanol by $0.56 and $0.24 per gallon to 
the ethanol producers and decrease to ethanol fuel refiners by $0.24 and 0.19 per gallon 
in the short and long run respectively, results on table 2.7 and 2.8.  
With respect to byproduct markets, DDG production would increase to 21 mmt 
while per ton price falls around $180. Production and price of WDG also follows change 
in ethanol production as does DDG, hence the quantity of WDGS will be  as high as 16 
mmt while its price will  fall as low as $70 per ton with a higher gasoline price as 
depicted on table  2.8.  
In the factor markets, the renewal of the tax credit induces more production of 
ethanol and eventually the demand for corn would reach to close to 5.4 billion of bushels 
and the price of corn hit almost $6.6 per bushel, (table 2.8). Under assumption of constant 
gasoline price, with each tax credit and mandate policy intervention, there will be an 
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approximately 8% increase on the price of corn. The corn price will go close to $7.20 per 
bushel and the total corn demand will jump to 6.6 billion bushel if the tax credit extended 
and at the same time the current gasoline price increased by 60%.  
Overall extending the tax credit could potentially stimulate ethanol production 
and eventually create an upward pressure on the demand for corn. Depending on the 
simulated outcomes, some of our results conform with the findings of (Babcock & 
Fabiosa 2011; Taheripour and Tyner 2010) 
9
 that expansion of ethanol has contributed to 
higher corn prices. 
Livestock producers face substantially higher feed costs. To livestock producers 
the key determinant of ethanol policy change is how much cost advantage does livestock 
producers could get from the net effect in the domestic feed market as a result of high 
DGS supply against high corn price.  
With regard to energy consumption, the demand for both natural gas and 
electricity will increase linearly with the percentage change in ethanol quantity under 
each policy simulation we ran. However the equilibrium market price of electricity and 
natural gas are barely affected by additional demand for energy from ethanol industry. 
Some of the factor market outcomes for selected inputs are presented on table 2.12 and 
2.13.  
 
                                                 
9
 If the blender tax credit had been abolished and if no mandates had been adopted, 
subsidies contributed an average of $0.14 per bushel (8%) to the increase in corn prices 
averaging across 2006–2009 (Babcock & Faiosa 2011). Between 2004 and early in 2008, 
out of $4/bushel increase, US ethanol subsidy contributed only $1 (25%), and the 
remaining $3 was attributed due to the demand pull of higher crude oil price (Taheripour 
and Tyner 2010).   
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2.5.4 The Short and Long-run Welfare Implication of Tax Credit and 
Mandate 
 
In this segment, we examine the change in consumer and producer  surplus in the 
ethanol, byproduct and factor markets under tax credit and mandate policies and their 
sensitivity to the change in gasoline price both in short and long run period.   
In the short-run, renewing the tax credit alone would result in a 10% (3 billion 
dollars) gain to ethanol buyers as a consumer surplus while with the mandate this gain 
will reach to 29 % (8.5 billion dollars). The percent change is computed from the initial 
value of ethanol obtained at the market equilibrium outcome.  We further explored the 
sensitivity of consumer and producer surplus for a 10% change in the premium gasoline 
price from the current $3.05; see the results presented on table 4.  Under mandate 
scenario, the gain in the consumer surplus dropped to 16% (4.7 billion dollar) by the time 
we administered a 10% change gasoline price.  Without tax credit and mandate, an 
increase in gasoline price will result ethanol fuel consumer to gain 6% (1.7 billion dollar) 
as consumer surplus compared to what they used to get at the equilibrium market 
outcome. 
In the long-run, the gain in consumer surplus generally will be smaller compared 
than the short-run. Moreover the size of gain in consumer surplus in each case of tax 
credit and mandate policy will be more or less similar. Without tax credit and mandate 
and again if gasoline price increases by 10%, there will be a 2% loss in consumer surplus. 
By the time gasoline price increased by 60%, there will be 15% loss in a consumer 
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surplus at the mandate level.   Without tax credit and mandate policy, the gain in 
consumer surplus will be around 14% (4 billion dollars). 
Under a tax credit, expanded ethanol production came at substantial cost as 
forgone revenue to the government.  For example, extending the tax credit in the short-
run the cost of the subsidy as forgone revenue will be 21% (6 billion dollars) while in the 
long-run it would go up to 23% (7 billion dollars) of the initial value of ethanol.  
 Based on results on table 2.7 and table 2.8, the cost of the mandate would be 61% 
of the initial value of ethanol in short run and ultimately fall to 22% in the long-run if we 
assume with constant gasoline price.  When we relaxed the constant gasoline price 
assumption and increased gasoline by 10 %, this cost dropped and eventually get zero by 
the time gasoline price increased by 50% (based on table 2.9).  The above cost is the cost 
pass along to the fuel consumer at the pump because of binding ethanol consumption 
mandate. 
As it can be retrieved from table 2.8, under mandate, ethanol plants would willing 
to sell for $2.94 per gallon which is  $1.20 per gallon higher than what fuel refiners are 
voluntarily willing to pay. However to meet the yearly blend amount issued by EPA, 
ethanol blenders will obtain a gallon of ethanol at whatever price ethanol producers are  
to supply. Eventually blenders pass through the price difference to motor fuel buyers at 
the pump. Moreover, it is apparent that the provision of a tax credit and mandate policy 
also led to an additional deadweight losses (DWL) that range from 1 to 6% of the initial 
value of ethanol.  The DWL will be higher under mandate than tax credit policy in the 
51 
 
short-run but the converse is true in the longer run. It is also true that as the price of 
gasoline increases, the DWL shrinks.  
Table 2.10 and 2.11 also present selective results of the consumer surplus for both 
dry and wet byproducts with each tax credit and mandate policy.  The gain in consumer 
surplus from WDG as a percentage of its initial value is higher for WDG than DDG in all 
policy simulations.  The gain in consumer surplus for both WDG and DDG will fall 
substantially with an increase in gasoline price.  
In the factor market for brevity we only present the producer surplus of corn 
producers and ethanol plant owners.  By extending the tax credit alone, in the long-run 
the gain in producer surplus to corn producers will be 10% of the initial value of corn that 
at market equilibrium, which is twice the level of change in the short run.  We calculated 
the initial value of corn based on the market equilibrium price of corn and the quantity of 
corn, 10.7 billion bushels, the 2011 cropping year domestic corn production. The percent 
gain in the producer surplus will be constant at 12 % irrespective of the change in 
gasoline price  at the mandate level since the additional demand for corn and its price is 
constant. Without tax credit and mandate intervention, a 60% increase in gasoline price 
will offer the highest gain to corn producer. In fact every increase in the price of corn 
allows the corn producers to gain proportional surplus whereas corn consumers lose some 
surplus since they have to pay more for a bushel of corn.   
To ethanol plant owners each ethanol policy intervention and in also corn price 
movements have a direct implication to sustain the ethanol production business. We 
computed the producer surplus of ethanol plant owner as a percentage of the rent value at 
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the initial equilibrium point. In the short-run the gain in producer surplus is higher in the 
mandate than tax credit scenario. The tax credit alone will give almost a 10% gain to 
ethanol owners as producer surplus of the initial value of rent. Without tax credit and 
mandate, a 10% increase in gasoline price alone will render a 6% gain in producer 
surplus to the ethanol plant owners. In the long run, returns to plants owners will start to 
decline with both policy interventions. In the long-run the gain as producer surplus as a 
result of mandate wills substantially small (3%), contrary to the huge gain (26%) 
obtained in the short-run. The increase in gasoline price alone will give higher gain of 
producer surplus in short-run than in the long-run.  
In this model with initial zero-profit equilibrium in the ethanol markets, all 
revenue losses or gains are passed through to the ethanol input markets, which of course 
include owners of ethanol plants (capital). It is evident that the net social benefit would 
be less with tax credit and mandate compared to no policies. 
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 2.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This article constructed a multi-output, multi-input partial market equilibrium 
model to explore the short and long run impacts of changing the two key ethanol policy 
drivers: the tax credit and the RFS2 mandate. The model was calibrated according to the 
year 2011 observations.   The study provides some quantitative estimates of the impacts 
of possible extension of tax credit and binding RFS2 mandate impacts on the prices and 
quantities of ethanol, byproducts, corn and other inputs with the combination of change 
in existing price of gasoline over a range of different assumptions. 
In the short run, irrespective of the tax credit policy, the production of ethanol will 
be consistently below the mandated 15 bgy  by 12 to 14 % . Yet contrary to this in the 
long-run, extending the tax credit will stimulate ethanol plants to produce above the 
minimum mandate amount.  
In the long-run, if ethanol plants are to produce the mandated level without tax 
credit policy, gasoline price would need to increase by order of 50% relative to the 2011 
level. In addition,  as long as the RFS2 mandate is in place, there will be a wedge 
between the prices that  ethanol producers are  willing to sell and fuel blenders are willing 
to pay. This wedge will shrink as the price of gasoline increases and eventually vanishes 
as gasoline price increased by 50%. In the short-run, the RFS2 mandate will create wedge 
as large as $1.20 per gallon. 
With respect to the corn market, our empirical results asserted that the mandate 
alone will increase the corn price by $0.83 and $0.50 per bushel in short and long run 
54 
 
respectively. If there were a 10% increase in gasoline price with no policies, the price of 
corn will rise to $6.27 (short-run) and $6.17 (long-run) per bushel. 
In the long-run, the gain of ethanol plant owners as producer surplus from either 
policy will be just 3% as a percent of the initial value of rent, substantially lower than the 
10-26% gain in the short-run.  Likewise, the gain of ethanol consumers from the policies 
shrinks as the price of gasoline increases  
It is just a year now that the tax credit and tariffs supports for ethanol expired, and 
it is unlikely that these financial incentives will be renewed. Entry of new ethanol plants 
seems not realistic given that the corn ethanol industry has already reached the 
production capacity required to meet the RFS2 requirement.  Our quantitative analysis 
indicates that without extending the tax credit and mandate, achieving the effective 
mandated requirement is unlikely. Ethanol plants operate at less than full capacity or 
some ethanol plants may close at least temporarily unless the price of gasoline increases 
substantially.  
To sum up the key question is whether the ethanol industry can fully utilize their 
current and future capacity to supply the minimum RFS2 required quantity without a tax 
credit or mandate to do so. Among host of factors our analysis underscores that without 
tax credit extension, if gasoline price increase by order of 50% and above 2011 level, 
ethanol production and consumption will achieve the minimum level of ethanol required 
by the RFS2. 
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I. Parameters and Values Used to Calibrate the Model 
 
Table 2.1 Parameters used to calibrate the model 
Parameters  Value Source/explanation 
Demand elasticity of Ethanol, short-run -0.89 Miranowski, (2007 
Demand elasticity of Ethanol, longrun -2.9 Luchansky & Monks (2009) 
Supply elasticity of Ethanol, short-run 0.29 Miranowski, (2007), 
Supply elasticity of ethanol, long-run 0.65 Elobeid & Tokgoz (2008) 
Demand elasticity  of ethanol with 
gasoline  1.06 Miranowski, (2007) 
Demand elasticity of DDG -1.28 Bechman et.al (2010) 
Demand elasticity of WDG -0.40 Babcock  (2009) 
Demand elasticity of investment capital  -0.74 Goolsbee (1999) 
Demand elasticity of labor  -0.61 Rich (2010) 
Ethanol produced in one bushel  2.86 Renewable Fuel Association (2012) 
MMBTU per gallon ethanol needed  0.0263 Perrin et.al (2008) 
KWH  per gallon ethanol needed  0.5700 Perrin et.al (2008) 
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Table 2.2 Value of Variables used to calibrate the model (raw data) 
Parameters  Value Source/explanation 
Ethanol price ($/gal)  2.55 Ethanol FOB price, Average for Midwest 
Ethanol supply (billion gallons) 13.95 2011 actual  production, RFA (2012) 
Ethanol supply (billion gallons) 14.25 
Domestic production  with 2015 capacity, RFA 
(2012) 
Gasoline price ($/gal) 3.05 Premium gasoline rack price,  EIA (2012) 
DDG price  ($/ton) 202.29 
Weighted average  for corn belt states (10% 
moisture basis), USDA Agricultural Marketing 
services: http://marketnews.usda.gov/portal/lg 
a
DDG supply (mmt) 18.9 U.S. Census Bureau Division of Manufacturing 
WDG Price  ($/ton) 83.18 
Weighted average for corn belt states ( 55-60% and 
60-70 % moisture), USDA Agricultural Marketing 
services: http://marketnews.usda.gov/portal/lg 
a
WDGS supply (mmt) 14.53 U.S. Census Bureau Division of Manufacturing 
Corn supply, billion bushels 10.7 U.S. corn long-term projections for 2011/2012 
b
Corn price ($/bushel) 6.40 
Weighted average farm price of corn ( 
USDA/NASS) 
Electricity price ($/KWH) 6.89 Industrial price, EIA (2012) 
Natural gas ($/MMBTU) 4.91 Industrial price, EIA (2012) 
Note: 
a
Quantity of DDG and WDG is from U.S. Census Bureau Division of 
Manufacturing, Mining and Construction Statistics - Report M311J - Fats and Oils, 
Oilseed Crushing (Table 4b).  
b
Corn price is national average obtained from USDA/NASS quick stat. 
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Table 2.3 Econometrically estimated elasticity parameters based on translog cost 
function
10
 
Parameters  Value 
Derived demand elasticity of corn -0.02 
Derived demand elasticity of electricity -0.14 
Derived demand elasticity of natural gas -1.06 
Supply elasticity of DDG 1.34 
Supply elasticity of WDG 1.26 
Cross supply price elasticity between DDG with  WDG 0.04 
Cross supply price elasticity between WDG with  DDG 0.099 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 The remaining inverse output supply elasticity in the  3 by 3 matrix is recovered using 
homogeneity and reciprocity restriction. The homogeneity restriction implies 0
1


n
j
ij .  
The reciprocity restriction implies
jiiijj
SS   , where
j
S , 
i
S are share of input in total 
cost for output i . where ij  is price elasticity of output. Where, n = 3 and ji  . The same 
approach is used to recover the 5 by 5 derived demand elasticity for inputs. 
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Table 2.4  Calculated excess input supply elasticity used to calibrate the model 
  
Short-run 
 
Long-run 
 
  
total market 
supply  
elasticity 
Market 
share to 
ethanol 
Excess 
supply to 
ethanol 
total market 
supply  
elasticity 
Market 
share to 
ethanol 
Excess 
supply to 
ethanol 
Corn 0.23 0.335 1.68 0.62 0.350 2.75 
Electricity 0.10 0.004 50.0 2.10 0.004 696 
Natural gas 1.89 0.031 65 0.59 0.030 36 
labor & other 0.77 5E-05 27951 1.38 5E-05 40280 
Capital 
  
0.001       5 
Note: Market share to ethanol is an author calculation based on the 2011 and projected 
data. For corn is from USDA, Natural gas and electricity based on data from US Energy 
Information Administration. Labor is from US Census Bureau. Other (enzyme, chemical, 
water, other) is based on US Census Bureau, Division of Manufacturing. 
Sources of Short and long run total supply elasticity respectively; Corn: Gardner (2007), 
Moss, Livanis & Scmitz (2010). Electricity and Natural gas: AEO (2010), National 
Energy Models (EMF 2003). Labor: Rich (2010). Capital: Edgerton (2010) 
 
 
Table 2.5 The cost share of input/Marginal Cost elasticity used in both short and long run 
model 
 Cost share 
Corn 0.72 
Electricity 0.01 
Natural gas 0.05 
Labor & other 0.10 
Capital 0.11 
Note: the details how these shares were calculated presented in table 1f. The share of 
capital is calculated as the share of rent from the total revenue. 
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Table 2.6 Parameters used to compute the cost share of variable inputs 
Cost component 
Quantity of input 
Per gallon of ethanol 
Average 
price 
Corn 2.86 6.01 
Electricity  0.5700 0.0688 
Natural gas 0.0202 5.00 
Additional N.gas for drying 60% of DGS 0.0093 5.00 
Labor & management  0.0005 113.1 
Other (enzyme, chemical, water , other) 0.0013 194.1 
Note: Price and quantity definition for corn, electricity and natural gas are: $/bushel, 
$/kWh and $/MMBTU respectively.  
Note: Implicit quantity indexes is calculated by dividing survey sample expenditures on 
personnel and on all other processing inputs by the sample-period average values of the 
respective price indexes. Share of each input is the cost share in total revenue.   The cost 
of each input is computed taking the price of input multiplied by the quantity index. The 
quantity index of the four inputs, except capital, is computed by taking the average input 
requirement per gallon of ethanol obtained from Perrin et.al (2009) and multiplying it by 
the 2011 annual ethanol production. The price of labor is the Employment Cost Index 
(series CIS101) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; the price of other is the Producer 
Price Index for the ethyl alcohol manufacturing industry (series PCU325193325193) 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/#prices). For further 
understanding how the author computed the cost components refer table 2 and equation 4 
in Perrin et.al (2009). 
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II. Tables of Results  
 
Table 2.7 The Shor-trun policy impacts: estimated market-clearing prices and quantities 
of outputs 
 
 
 
Constant gasoline 
price  
10 % gasoline price 
increase  
  
Initial 
base 
value 
Market 
equilibrium 
With 
Tax 
credit 
With 
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With  
Mandate 
Ethanol, billion gal 14.3 12.16 13.24 15.00 12.84 15.00 
Ethanol producer ,$/gal 2.55 2.39 2.60 2.94 2.52 2.81 
Ethanol consumer ,$/gal 2.05 2.39 2.15 1.76 2.52 2.04 
DDG, mmt 19.3 16.9 18.1 20.1 17.7 20.1 
Price of DDG, $/ton 202 222 209 189 214 189 
WDG, mmt 14.8 12.7 13.8 15.5 13.4 15.5 
Price of WDG, $/ton 83 98 88 70 92 70 
Corn, billion bushel 5.1 4.39 4.78 5.40 4.63 5.40 
Price of corn, $/bushel 6.4 6.07 6.38 6.89 6.27 6.89 
 
 
 Table 2.8 The Long-run policy impacts: market-clearing prices and quantities of outputs 
 
Constant 
gasoline price 
10 % increase in 
gasoline price  
60%  increase in 
gasoline price 
Variables  
With 
Tax 
credit 
With  
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With 
Mandate 
Without mandate 
& tax credit 
Ethanol, billion gallon 15.11 15.0 12.73 15.0 15.57 
Ethanol producer price, $/gal 2.64 2.63 2.43 2.63 2.68 
Ethanol consumer price, $/gal 2.19 2.19 2.43 2.28 2.68 
DDG, mmt 20.4 20.3 17.6 20.3 20.9 
Price of DDG, $/ton 186 187 215 187.4 180 
WDG, mmt 15.7 15.6 13.3 15.6 16.1 
Price of WDG, $/ton 69 70 93 70 64 
Corn, billion bushel 5.4 5.4 4.6 5.4 5.59 
Price of corn, $/bushel 6.59 6.57 6.17 6.57 6.67 
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Table 2.9 The Long-run mandate policy impacts: market-clearing prices and quantities of 
ethanol with 50% increase in premium gasoline price 
Variables  
Constant 
gasoline price 
10 %  
increase 
50 % 
increase  
60 % 
increase  
Ethanol, billion gallon 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Ethanol producer price, $/gal 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 
Ethanol consumer price, $/gal 2.19 2.28 2.68 2.71 
Note: Under the mandate policy, the change on gasoline price has only effect on the 
ethanol consumer price. Hence mandate has no effects on the rest of the quantity and 
price variable.  
 
 
 
Table 2.10 Short-run effect of shock on consumers (CS) and producer surplus (PS), as a 
percent of the initial value at the market equilibrium point 
 
 Constant gasoline 
price 
10 % gasoline price 
increase 
  
 
Variables 
Initial market value 
at equilibrium 
(Billions dollar) 
With 
Tax 
credit 
With 
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With  
Mandate 
Ethanol, CS 29.0 10.4 29.3 5.7 16.0 
DDG, CS 3.8 6.4 19.5 3.9 19.5 
WDG, CS 1.2 12.2 37.8 7.3 37.8 
Corn producer, PS 65 5.0 12.1 3.2 12.1 
Ethanol Plant owners, PS 4.5 9.9 26.0 6.2 26.0 
Cost to tax payers  
(% of initial value of ethanol) 
- 20.5  0.0  
Dead Weight Loss  
(% of initial value of ethanol) 
- 0.84 5.8 0.0 3.7 
Note: the change in a PS for ethanol plant owner is computed from the initial value of the 
rent. The cost to tax payers and DWL are computed as percent loss from the Initial value 
of ethanol.  
Note: The initial value of each output is computed as a product of price and quantity from 
initial market equilibrium outcome, i.e., without any policy intervention, whereas for 
Ethanol Plant owner’s is the rent at year 2011. Initial corn value is calculated for the 
entire corn market based on the total production in year 2011/12.  
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 Table 2.11 Long-run Effect of shock on consumers (CS) and producer surplus (PS)as a 
percent of the initial value at the market equilibrium point 
 
Constant gasoline 
price 
10 % increase in 
gasoline price  
60%  increase in 
gasoline price 
  
 
Variables 
With 
Tax 
credit 
With 
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With 
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With 
mandate 
Ethanol, CS 9.4 9.0 2.1 4.9 13.9 15.4 
DDG, CS 21.2 20.3 3.3 20.3 25.5 20.3 
WDG, CS 40.2 38.4 6.1 38.4 48.4 38.4 
Corn producer, PS 10.6 11.6 2.1 11.6 12.4 11.6 
Ethanol Plant owners, PS 3.1 3.0 0.7 3.0 3.5 3.0 
Cost to tax payers  
(% of initial value of ethanol) 
24.8  0.0  0.0  
Dead Weight Loss  
(% of initial value of ethanol) 
2.3 2.1 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.43 
 
Table 2.12 The Short-run estimated market-clearing prices and quantities of energy 
inputs 
 
 
Constant gasoline 
price 10 % gasoline price increase 
 
Market 
equilibrium 
With Tax 
credit 
With 
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With  
Mandate 
Natural gas, billion BTU 8.39 10.03 11.34 9.74 11.34 
Natural gas, $/MBTU 4.89 4.91 4.92 4.90 4.92 
Electricity,  billion  
KWH 8.34 9.96 11.25 9.66 11.25 
Electricity, cent/KWH 6.88 6.90 6.92 6.90 6.92 
 
 
Table 2.13 The Long-run estimated market-clearing prices and quantities of energy inputs 
 
Constant gasoline 
price 
10 % gasoline price 
increase 
60 % gasoline price 
increase 
  
With Tax 
credit 
With 
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With  
Mandate 
Without 
mandate & 
tax credit 
With  
Mandate 
Natural gas, billion BTU 11.40 11.32 9.65 11.32 11.74 11.32 
Natural gas, $/MBTU 4.91 4.91 4.90 4.91 4.92 4.91 
Electricity,  billion  KWH 11.34 11.27 9.58 11.27 11.69 11.27 
Electricity, cent/KWH 6.89 6.89 6.89 6.89 6.89 6.89 
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Appendix 2 
Mathematical Footnotes 
I. Market clearing condition 
Equation 2 presented in the analytical model 
represents the market clearing condition 
where the derivative of cost 
function ),( WYC , with respect to output, Y  
gives us the marginal cost. 
s
y PC
Y
WYC


 ),(
                                    1a 
Total differentiation of yC  gives us: 
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ywyy dPdwCdyC                                         
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Where 
YPs
  is the vector of price elasticity 
of outputs 
dsWP
  is the vector marginal cost elasticitiy 
with respect to input 
 
II. Optimal factor demand can be obtained 
using equation 3. 
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Totally differentiating of wC  
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Elasticity of input with respect to output, 
XY , can be computed based  on the 
following  property wyC = ywC   and it implies: 
XY = dsWP
s
y
d
x
S
S
)
ˆ
(
ˆ
                                     2e 
dsWP
  is the inverse of the vector marginal 
cost elasticitiy with respect to input 
s
ySˆ  the vector of the share of output Y in the 
total revenue 
 d
x
Sˆ  are the  vector share of input X in the 
total cost 
 
III. Excess supply elasticity of input 
mathematically depicted as 
 
e
i
r
i
r
i
t
i
i
S
S )/()(  
                                     3a 
 
i  = the excess supply elasticity of input i  
t
i  =total market supply elasticity of input i  
r
i  =elasticity of demand of input i  by the 
rest of economy 
e
iS   =market share of input i  to ethanol  
r
iS  =market share of input i  to the rest of 
the economy. 
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Chapter 3: Soil Organic Carbon Sequestration in Corn Belt States:  
                   A Meta Regression analysis 
 
Abstract 
This study investigated the extent to which statistical heterogeneity among results of multiple 
studies on soil organic carbon (SOC) sequestration rate in response to conventional tillage (CT) 
and no-till (NT) can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies. The analysis 
employed a random effect meta-regression technique using the data obtained from recently 
published experimental trials under continuous corn (CC) and corn soybean (CS) rotation system 
from selected Corn Belt states.  
Regarding the difference in the rate of SOC sequestration between NT and CT, our results shows 
that the percentage of heterogeneity in the true treatment effect that is attributable to between-
study variability is 49%, whereas 51 % is attributable to within-study sampling variability.  
 We find that 26% of the between-study variance is explained by the explanatory variables 
considered, and the remaining between-study variance appears almost zero. The regression 
results support the argument that the difference between NT and CT decreases as measurement 
depth increases. The results also show that the higher the initial SOC the higher the NT SOC 
sequestration rate relative to the CT sequestration rate. A test for publication biases in the 
analysis indicated no evidence for the presence of small-study effects. 
Key words: SOC sequestration rate, no-till, conventional tillage, Meta regression 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Results from many individual experimental studies across Midwest states and globally 
showed considerable heterogeneity on the results of rate of SOC sequestration in response to NT 
and CT practices.  Given the range and variability of  estimated sequestration rate, this study 
combines the results of independent studies and doing regional assessments in order to uncover 
the source of this heterogeneity.  
Large areas of cropland in U.S. Corn Belt are being gradually converted from CT to 
conservation tillage particularly to NT   systems, and this change is partly driven by the fact that 
widespread adoption of conservation tillage, specifically NT, would sequester a substantial 
amount of SOC than CT (Christopher et.al 2009; Gal et.al 2007; Baker et.al 2007; Al-Kaisi and 
Yin 2005; Lal et.al 1998; West and Post 2002; Blanco-Canqui & Lal, 2007).   However, it is an 
unsettled argument whether such practices actually sequester SOC.  Higher SOC sequestration in 
NT systems is reported in many studies when soil was sampled up to 30cm depth. However in a 
few studies where sampling extended deeper than 30cm (Ga’l et.al 2007; Ogle et.al 2008) and in 
experimental trials based on gas exchange measure ( Verma et.al 2005; Baker et al. 2007),  NT 
showed a higher or lower  SOC sequestration. 
Approximately 49% of agricultural SOC sequestration can be achieved by adopting 
conservation tillage and residue management (Lal et al. 1998). However SOC loss consistently 
increases with percentage residue harvest (Blanco-Canqui & Lal 2007). The partial or complete 
removal of corn stover to produce biofuel reduces the amount of residue returned to the soil and 
may increase the risk of soil degradation and eventually leads to depletion of the SOC pool and 
greenhouse gases (GHG) emission of (Lal 2002 2004; Johnson et.al 2004 2007).  SOC 
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sequestration is a key component in the life cycle of biofuel production (Ney & Schnoor 2002; 
Adler et al., 2007) and crucial in determining the GHG reduction potential of biofuels relative to 
fossil fuels (Anderson-Teixeira et.al 2009).  Various studies have quantified changes in SOC 
under potential biofuel crops. Results are variable and have yet extensive effort is needed to 
develop coherent pictures (Johnson et.al 2007; Wilhelm et.al 2007).  
In the time of recent trend toward development of cellulosic biofuel production from crop 
residues, it is crucial to put forward research findings related to SOC sequestration to understand 
the relative advantage of conservation tillage over the CT.  There is disparity among reported 
experimental results on the relative advantage of NT over CT in SOC sequestration rate and yet 
this is the information we should discern in such kind of study. Hence a regional assessment, 
examining data from distinct cultivation systems could justify a broad understanding of NT and 
CT effects on SOC in Corn Belt states.  Therefore analyzing the results of different studies with 
heterogeneous results across Corn Belt states using Meta regression analysis is essential to 
elucidate the source of heterogeneity, particularly now when large areas of cropland are being 
converted to long-term NT systems based on the premise that NT soils sequester SOC.  
 There have been several meta-analyses and scientific literature reviews on the effects of NT 
and CT on SOC globally (West and Post 2002; Alvarez 2005; Angers and Eriksen-Hamel 2007; 
Angers et al. 1997; Six et al 2002; Anderson-Teixeira et.al 2009) and also regionally in North 
America (Christopher et.al 2007; Blanco-Canqui et.al 2007; Ogle et.al 2003). 
The purpose of this study is therefore to conduct a Meta-regression analysis to investigate the 
extent to which statistical heterogeneity among results of multiple studies on SOC sequestration 
can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies. The analysis would help us to explore 
study-to-study variation of SOC sequestration rate by determining the extent to which methods, 
69 
 
 
design and data affect reported results.  The analysis is based on recently peer reviewed 
published studies on SOC sequestration from long-term paired experiments exclusively under 
continuous corn (CC) and corn soybean (CS) rotation system . The data collected were from 
multiyear paired experiments that ran at least for five years. To give fresh perspective and 
augment the rapid development in approach of SOC measurements, only published studies since 
year 2000 are included in our sample. In the study we also investigate publication and related 
biases since most meta-analysis are susceptible to such problems.   
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 exposits the theoretical 
model. This theoretical and analytical model is based on Meta regression and its estimation 
procedure is using random effect model. Section 3 describes the data and material used in this 
study.  The empirical results of our application and implication of this study is presented in 
section 4, and in the last section summary and concluding remarks are then provided. The 
appendixes section contains results and figures from the regression analysis, and a tabular 
summary of the data used in our meta-analyses. 
3.2 Theoretical Model 
 
Meta-analysis is widely applied in the medicine, economics and many other social 
sciences fields (Thompson and Higgins 2002; Stanley and Jarrell 1998; Stanley 2001) and now 
this technique is increasingly applied in physical science such as ecology and biology. 
Particularly the application is gaining attention in the field of global change ecology (Manley 
et.al 2005). The analysis is a quantitative method of combining the results of independent studies 
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to investigate the extent to which statistical heterogeneity between results
11
 of multiple studies 
that can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies (Fox 2009; Thompson and 
Higgins 2002; Stanley 2001).  
 
3.2.1 Meta-Regression Model  
 
The model here is based on random effects with a generic form shown in equation 1. For 
the subject i in the study j , we can write the basic underling model for outcome ijY  
 
ijjijiij
XY  
0
         (1) 
We assume that each study j  provides  total of n studies to estimate  the effect of 
interest,  i , which here  is a difference in rate of SOC sequestration from NT to CT.  Each study 
also reports a standard error for this estimate, i , which we assume is known. Inference is based 
on the assumption that the studies are a random sample of some hypothetical population of 
studies. 
0
  is an intercept of the regression model. 
  is a k × 1 vector of regression coefficients to estimate, and iX  is a 1 × k vector containing the 
observed trial-level explanatory  variables  for study j . Explanatory variables used here are 
initial SOC, depth of the soil sampled, yield of corn and soybean, mean annual temperature and 
dummy for crop rotation (continuous corn verses corn-soybean rotation).   
                                                 
11
 Heterogeneity is inevitable in meta-analysis since   individual studies are never identical with 
respect to study populations and other factors that can cause differences between studies (Van 
Houwelingen et.al 2002). 
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Our model allows for residual heterogeneity, assuming that the true effects follow a 
normal distribution around the linear predictor: 
),(~| 2iiii NY  , where ),(~
2 ii XN         
(2) 
 
),0(~
2
eij N   and ),0(~
2 Nj        
             (3) 
i  is a true effect and has a normal distribution  around the linear predictor, iX . Here ij  is 
within study error term whereas  j  is between study error. 
2  is between study variance and 
should  be estimated from the data
12
.  
As shown on equation 4,  i  , is determined by the true effect i  plus the within-study error i . 
In turn, i , is determined by the mean of all true effects,   and the between-study error i . 
More generally, for any observed effect i ,  
 
ijiiii   = ijiiX           (4) 
 
There are two levels of sampling and two sources of error when we are dealing with 
random effect model. At first, the true effect sizes i  are distributed about μ with a variance 
2  
that reflects the actual distribution of the true effects about their mean. Second, the observed 
effect i  for any given i  will be distributed about that i  with a variance 
2  that depends 
primarily on the sample size for that study. Therefore, in assigning weights to estimate μ, we 
                                                 
12
 In the random effects model, there is between-study as well as within-study components of the 
variance term (Borenstein et.al 2007). 
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need to deal with both sources of sampling error – within studies ( ij ), and between studies 
( j ). An excellent treatment of this approach can be found from (Borenstein et.al 2007; Harbord 
and Higgins 2008) 
 As Harbord and Higgins (2008) presented in their analysis, all algorithms for random-
effects meta-regression first estimate the between-study variance, 2 , and then estimate the 
coefficients,  , by weighted least squares by  weighting using  )/(1 22  i  
13
. The method used 
to decompose the variance is to calculate the total variance and then to isolate the within-studies 
variance. The variance between-studies ( 2 ) is obtained as the difference between these two 
values. The proportion of between-study variance explained by independent variables can be 
calculated by comparing the estimated between-study variance, 
2ˆ , with its value when no 
covariates are fit, 2ˆo  . Adjusted 
2R  is the relative reduction in the between-study variance as 
shown in equation 5. 
2222 ˆ/)ˆˆ( ooadjR          
                                   (5) 
 
3.2.2 Mechanism to Investigate Publication Biases  
 
In this section we provide the mechanism to investigate publication and small sample 
bias using funnel plots and Egger test (Egger et al. 1997; Harbord and Harris 2009). If 
publication bias exists, any meta-analysis based on it will be similarly biased (Sterne et.al 2000; 
Palmer and Peters 2008). Funnel plot is a visual method used to test for the likely presence of 
                                                 
13
 The default algorithm in our regression is residual (restricted) maximum likelihood (REML), 
and directly maximizes the residual (restricted) log likelihood using Stata command (Harbord 
and Higgins 2008). 
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publication and related biases in meta-analysis
14
. Publication bias may lead to asymmetrical 
funnel plots,  however this bias is only one of a number of possible causes of funnel-plot 
asymmetry (Sterne and Harbord 2004)
15
.Judgment based on such visual interpretation for 
asymmetry is inherently subjective (Harbord and Harris 2009).  Rather we used an Egger test 
based on a linear regression approach to measure funnel plot asymmetry (Egger et al. 1997) 
shown in equation 6 below. 
 
iii ESeffect   .11          (6) 
ieffect  in our case is the difference in ∆SOC sequestration rate of each study i ,  iES.  is the 
standard error of study j .  We can test for H0: 1 =0,   this simple meta-regression model is to 
investigate whether a research literature is affected by publication selection (Egger et al. 1997; 
Harbord and Harris 2009; Stanley and Doucouliagos 2011).  
3.3 Material/Data Used in this Study  
 
Based on the criteria we set, we found 13 peer-reviewed published studies that reported 
rate of SOC sequestration in nine states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,   Minnesota, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and South Dakota). The total number observations are 78, see on 
table 3.8.    
                                                 
14
  Funnel plot is a simple scatter plots of the treatment effects  (difference in rate of SOC 
sequestration in our case ) estimated from individual studies against a measure of study size  here 
in our case a standard error of the effect size (Sterne et.al 2005; Palmer and Peters 2008;Sterne 
and Egger 2001; Harbord and Harris 2009). 
15
 Egger et al. (1997) pointed out potential sources of asymmetry in funnel plots: Selection biases 
(e.g. Publication bias), true heterogeneity (e.g. Size of effect differs according to study size), 
Data irregularities (e.g. Poor methodological design of small studies, Inadequate analysis), 
Heterogeneity due to poor choice of effect measure. 
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 Key data gatherer were soil depth, duration of tillage study, yield of corn and soybean
16
, types of 
rotations, mean annual precipitation and temperature at experimental sites. In addition, the 
standard error of the rate of SOC sequestration for each study was gathered.  If these standard 
errors were not reported, we estimated taking the mean of SOC sequestration rate and divide by 
the number of replication of experimental plots. Furthermore, if specific details such as yield, 
temperature and precipitation of the study were not reported, we estimated them based on the 
county level information where the experiment was conducted. 
Studies were included in the data set if the following criteria were met: (1) paired studies 
that compared NT with CT exclusively under continuous corn and corn-soybean rotation system. 
The tillage could be a multisystem with fertilizer treatment but with no residue treatment trials. 
To be part of the analysis, each study must also report at least the rate of SOC sequestration and 
initial or final SOC value. We dropped studies, if the specific paired tillage experimental studies 
included crops other than corn and soybean in the CC and CS crop rotation.  (2) SOC was 
sampled to depths ≥15cm.17 (3) experiments that ran at least five years, since a multiyear 
experimental study is necessary as there is difficulty to adequately detect a small change in SOC 
stock over a time period of less than 5yr (Post et.al. 2001; Ellert et.al 2002; Baker et.al 2007; 
personal communication with Varvel 2011).   Almost all of the studies reviewed were from dry 
land agriculture trails except four irrigated trials from Nebraska. Except 3 eddy covariance 
studies , the majority of samples are based on the standard method for assessment of SOC 
sequestration using soil sampling of long-term tillage research trial plots.  
                                                 
16
 The yield for corn and soybean are the average yield during the experimental period. For those 
studies that didn’t report yield during the experimental period, we used the average yield of the 
county where the experimental trails ran. 
17
 The necessity of deeper depth sampling is for improved accuracy in the assessment of C or N 
sequestration with no-till versus conventional tillage systems is vital (Ga’l et.al 2007). 
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3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
  
Table 3.1 and 3.2 portray the summary statistics of the data used in this study. The results 
of the regression analysis are summarized from Tables 3.3 through 3.7. The summary statistics 
indicate that the duration of the studies varied from 4 to 51 year, with an average of 16 years.  
The average depth of the soil sampled under both tillage practices across all studies was 30 cm.  
The dependent variable which is the difference in the rate of SOC from NT to CT has a mean 
value of 0.09 Mg C ha
-1
yr
-1
.   
The percentage of between-study heterogeneity that is attributable to variability in the 
true treatment effect is 49%, whereas 51 % is attributable to within-study sampling variability. 
Our regression results also show that 26% of the between-study variance is explained by the 
explanatory variables considered, and the remaining between-study variance appears almost 
zero, 0.003, depicted on table 3.3.  We examined whether specific variables in the regression 
analysis explain any of the heterogeneity of treatment effects between studies. The joint test for 
all five independent variables gives a p-value of 0.009, indicating there is evidence for an 
association of at least one or more of the explanatory variables with the size of the treatment 
effect.  
The positive coefficient on the initial SOC on table 3.3 indicates that the predicted rate of 
SOC sequestration under NT relative CT increases. We can infer based on this result that on 
average a plot under NT sequester 0.086 Mg C ha-
1
yr
-1
 more SOC than CT. The plotted figure 
with fitted meta-regression line of the rate of ∆SOC against the initial SOC on Figure 3.2 shows 
that at the low level of initial SOC the difference between these two tillage systems was smaller 
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and close to zero, but as the initial SOC level is higher the NT system gains more rate 
sequestration of SOC than the corresponding CT system.    
Negative regression coefficients on the depth of soil measurement support the contention that the 
relative no-till advantage over conventional tillage declined with deeper measurement depth. 
Figure 3.4 also shows the clear relationship between depth and SOC sequestration rate. This 
result conforms to the argument that SOC gain from NT that is based on shallow sample depth 
disappears when deeper samples are included (Angers et al.1997; Dolan et al. 2006; Baker et.al 
2007; Six et al. 2002; Gal et.al 2005; Vandenbygaart et al. 2002, 2003).  
Our regression result on Table 3.3 and 3.5  also showed  that for every bushel of corn 
yield increase, keeping other factor constant , the rate of ∆SOC sequestration under NT system 
increases 0.001 Mg C ha-
1
yr
-1
 higher  SOC than CT.  However for every bushel increase in a 
soybean yield provides a 0.004 to 0.013 Mg C ha-
1
yr
-1  
fewer  SOC  sequestration rate to NT than 
CT.  Agronomically it is believed that the actual effect of the different tillage practices on soil C 
storage is highly dependent on the types of crops produced in the field (Ga´l et.al 2007; Huggins 
et.al 2007; Varvel 2006).  In this regard corn has a greater biomass production than soybean and 
combination of this quantity of biomass with NT practices may give an additional advantage  for 
corn to sequester more SOC than the CT.   
The dummy variable rotation for coefficient measures the average difference in SOC 
sequestration rate between CC and CS rotation given the same level of initial SOC, depth, corn 
and soybean yield and temperature variables. After controlling the above explanatory variables, 
NT system sequesters 0.05 Mg C ha-
1
yr
-1
 less SOC than CT when the rotation system is under 
continuous corn than corn-soybean, shown on table 3.3. The above result seems odd from the 
agronomic stand point under ideal condition. Various studies in Midwest showed that SOC 
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sequestration under continuous corn has been normally higher than under corn–soybean rotation 
(Lal et al. 1997; Paustian et al. 1997; Gal et.al 2007; Jagadamma et.al 2007; Jarecki and Lal 
2003). It is also believed that differences in SOC sequestration between crop rotations is largely 
influenced by the quantity of crop residues returned to the soil.   However the differential in SOC 
sequestration in our analysis may be due to rotation or other factors other than rotation that we 
have not controlled for in the regression. Studies indicated that tillage effects on SOC storage 
have been characterized either as a single factor or in combination with crop residue 
management, N fertilization, or both (Huggins et.al. 2007 Havlin et al. 1990; Franzluebbers et al. 
1994; Paustian et al. 1997).  
It is informative to compare the intercept (our base variable in the dummy, CC) on the 
equation to be estimated when all other explanatory variables are dropped from the equation.  
The intercept on the result of this simple regression is the average difference that we can get for a 
rate of ∆SOC when the rotation is under continuous corn system. From table 3.4 result therefore, 
plots under CC would provide 0.0161 Mg C ha-
1
yr
-1
  fewer   rate of ∆SOC to NT than CT. The 
coefficient on this dummy is the difference in the average a rate of ∆SOC of  CC relative to CS. 
The above results offer comparison of-means-test between CC and CS rotation system. The 
estimated difference between CC to CS is 0.037 Mg C ha-
1
yr
-1
. However this difference is not 
statistically significant as shown on table 3.4. 
Among other factors, the differential effects of rotation on SOC sequestration rate in both 
tillage systems may vary by the depth of the soil. Clap et.al (2000) argued that very little crop 
residue was mechanically buried below 15 cm in the NT treatment unless moved by earthworm 
activity. Fourteen years of experiment on tillage and rotation interaction,  (Huggins et.al 2005),  
indicated  that significant contributions to greater SOC under CC for Chisel Plough and NT, as 
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compared with Mold board Plough, occurred from C storage below tillage operating depths (30- 
to 45-cm). To put the above arguments in perspective, we added an interaction variable of the 
dummy rotation with depth-this actually would allow us to have different slope and give more 
exposition on the relationship among tillage practices, crop rotation and depth.  Using our new 
interaction variable, we then tested whether the effect of continuous corn and corn-soybean 
rotation over rate of ∆SOC is the same at all depth of the soil.   
We are now testing the hypothesis that the average difference in rate of SOC 
sequestration between NT and CT are identical for CC and CS rotation that have similar depth of 
soil measurement. Under the null hypothesis the coefficient over the dummy and interaction term 
must both be zero.  Our F test value gave us F (2, 70) = 3.14 and Prob > F=0.0495. Therefore we 
rejected the above hypothesis, implying that there would be variation in SOC sequestration 
between CC and CS at the same depth of soil. Another important hypothesis we test is that the 
difference in rate of SOC sequestration (from NT to CT) is the same for CC and CS rotation 
system across all depth of soil.  Our test F (1, 70) = 3.19, Prob > F = 0.0470. We then accepted 
the hypothesis that the difference in ∆SOC sequestration rate is similar across all depth. 
Another important factor that can influence the relative impacts of tillage practices on 
SOC sequestration rate is the temperature. The regression results both on Table 3.3 and 3.5 and 
Figure 3.5 shows the effects of average regional temperature variation on SOC sequestration 
over the difference between NT to CT had a significant correlation between temperature variable 
and differential SOC sequestration rates. The regression results reveal that a one degree Celsius 
increase in temperature would reduce the sequestration of NT to CT by -0.0612 (table 3.3). 
 
 
79 
 
 
Publication Bias and Model Validation  
 The diagonal lines on figure 3.5 are representing the 95% confidence limits around the 
summary treatment effect. As shown on the figure 3.5, the 95% of the studies lied within the 
funnel defined by these straight lines and the plot resembled a symmetrical, inverted funnel. This 
may suggest the absence of publication bias. To avoid subjective judgment we performed a test 
of small-study effects based on equation 6. The estimated bias coefficient shown on Table 3.7 is 
-0.202 with a standard error of 0.295, giving a p-value of 0.496. The test thus provides no 
evidence for the presence of small-study effects. Figure 3.6 also asserted the absence of this bias. 
Finally we launched a   model validation and check for outliers and influential studies based on 
the statistics available from prediction
18
. Figure 3.7 suggests that the assumption of normal 
random effects is sufficient, and there are no notable outliers because the largest standardized 
shrunken residual is only slightly over 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 This probability plot can be used to check the assumption of normality of the random effects, 
although because this assumption has been used in generating the predictions, only gross 
deviations are likely to be detected.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this study we used meta-regression model to explore the sources of study-to-study 
variation on the reported results of SOC sequestration rate due to NT and CT in selected Corn 
Belt states.  
Our analysis underscores that nearly half of the variation on the results of reported rate of SOC 
sequestration between published studies is due to variability in the true treatment effect while the 
remaining half is as a result of within study sampling variation. Our regression result also 
showed a quarter of between-study variance is explained by the explanatory variables 
considered, and the remaining within-study variance appears very small.   
Although most of the coefficient of explanatory variables in the regression results 
exhibited expected sign from agronomic stand point, some of the coefficients were not 
significant. An important point we can infer based on our analysis is that the rate of SOC 
sequestration differences between NT and CT disappears as measurement depth increases.  On 
average No-Till system sequesters more SOC than conventional tillage for every bushel of corn 
yield increases however the opposite was true for the case of soybean yield.   The observed gain 
in SOC sequestration rate of CT over NT when the crop rotation system was under continuous 
corn   contrast with previous results and agronomic practices in Corn Belt  states, this  may be 
attributed to several factors other than variables which we cannot fully observed and controlled 
in our study. 
In the analysis we only showed the absence of publication bias or small study effect via 
funnel plot and a test for funnel plot asymmetry. One should note that these tests do not offer a 
solution to the bias problems if any exist rather alert us the potential presence of the problem. 
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Therefore correcting for publication bias will make an important practical ways to provide better 
understanding on Meta-analysis results. 
Overall the combined results clearly showed that there is considerable variation in the 
rate of SOC sequestration in response to NT and CT across the study states. In addition to  the 
tillage management, the presence of having heterogeneous biophysical characteristics such as 
yield, initial SOC, temperature and other explanatory variables we listed, difference trial design 
and quality as well as publication selection bias are responsible  for heterogeneity in reported 
differences in SOC sequestration rate.  
Our analysis is subject to several limitations such as the assumption we made on standard error, 
and other explanatory variables, as a result estimated coefficients and results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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I. Tables of Result 
 
 Table 3.1 Summary statistics for the variables under this study 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
19
Rate of ∆SOC, Mg C ha-1 yr-1 0.088 0.47 -1.13 2.4 
Initial SOC, Mg C ha
-1
 54 29 21 159 
Duration, year 16 15 4 51 
Depth, cm 30 18 15 75 
Corn yield, bu ha
-1
 yr
-1
 132 47 66 245 
Soybean yield, bu ha
-1
 yr
-1
 40 15 24 92 
Temperature, 
O
C 9.4 1.7 6.2 11.1 
Rain fall, mm/annum 837 126 580 1112 
Note: total observations=78 
 
Table 3.2 Rate of ∆SOC sequestration by depth of soil measured 
Depth, 
cm  
Rate of ∆soc,  
Mg C ha
-1
 yr
-1
 
Depth frequency 
(%) 
15 -0.03 47.4 
20 -0.08 2.6 
30 0.16 23.1 
45 0.51 5.1 
46 0.05 5.1 
60 0.28 14.1 
75 -0.04 2.6 
Note: 63% of the observations are under Corn-soybean rotation while the remaining 37% is 
Continuous corn  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 The dependent variable is the difference in SOC sequestration rate from NT to CT. 
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Table 3.3 Joint Meta-regression results: the dependent variable is rate of ∆SOC, Mg C/ha/yr 
REML estimate of between-study variance tau2=0.003 
% residual variation due to heterogeneity I
2
-res 49.43% 
Proportion of between-study variance explained Adj R
2
= 25.83% 
Joint test for all covariates Model F(6,71)= 3.14 
With Knapp-Hartung modification Prob > F= 0.0087 
Explanatory variables Coeff. At  mean 
Initial SOC 0.0016* 0.086 
 
(2.12)  
Depth -0.0014 -0.042 
 
(-0.98)  
Corn yield 0.0008 0.106 
 
(1.64)  
Soybean yield -0.013* -0.520 
 
(-2.13)  
temperature -0.057* 0.536 
 
(-2.34)  
Continuous corn rotation -0.0495  
 
(-1.05)  
_cons 0.860**  
 
(2.81)  
t statistics in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; The F-table distribution at 95% is  
F(6,71)=2.23 
Note the mean is calculated based on the mean observed values for each variable shown on table 
3.1. 
 
 
Table 3.4 Independent regression results for continuous corn and corn-soybean rotation 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
continuous corn rotation 0.0367 0.0311 1.18 0.241 
_cons -0.0161 0.0251 -0.64 0.523 
Adj R-squared =2.07%; I
2
 residual = 80.27% 
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Table 3.5 Joint regression results: the dependent variable is rate of ∆soc, Mg C/ha/yr 
REML estimate of between-study variance tau2= 002 
% residual variation due to heterogeneity I
2
-res= 52.74% 
Proportion of between-study variance explained Adj-R
2
= 45.9% 
Joint test for all covariates Model F(7,70)= 3.80 
With Knapp-Hartung modification Prob > F= 0.0015 
Explanatory variables Coeff. At  mean 
Initial SOC 0.0042**  
(3.23) 
0.227 
Depth -0.0013 
(-0.98) 
-0.039 
Corn yield 0.0008 
(1.71) 
0.106 
Soybean yield -0.0042 
(-1.73) 
-0.168 
temperature -0.0612* 
(-2.53) 
-0.575 
continuous corn 
rotation 
0.115 
(1.32) 
 
depth*cont -0.0064* 
(-2.22) 
 
_cons 0.675* 
  (2.15) 
 
t-statistics in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The F-table distribution 
F(7,70)=2.14 
Note the mean is calculated based on the mean observed values for each variable shown on table 
3.1. 
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Table 3.6 Joint Meta-regression results: the dependent variable percentage change in SOC 
REML estimate of between-study variance tau2=35.8 
% residual variation due to heterogeneity I
2
-res 99.98% 
Proportion of between-study variance explained Adj R
2
= 31.02% 
Joint test for all covariates Model F(6,71)= 6.66 
With Knapp-Hartung modification Prob > F= 0.0000 
Explanatory variables Coeff. 
Initial SOC 0.0614*   
 
(2.00) 
Depth -0.164** 
 
(-3.10)    
Corn yield 0.0219    
 
(1.37)    
Soybean yield 0.0429    
 
(0.87)    
temperature 1.548** 
 
(3.08)    
Continuous corn rotation -3.578*   
 
(-2.22)    
_cons -24.86*** 
 
(-4.32)    
t statistics in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The F-table distribution at 95% is  
F(6,71)=2.23 
 
 
Table 3.7 Egger's test for small-study effects: Regress standard normal deviate of intervention 
effect estimate against its standard error 
Std_Eff Coef. Std. Err t P>t 
Slope -0.054 0.012 4.43 0.000 
Bias -0.202 0.295 -0.68 0.496 
Test of H0: no small-study effects, P = 0.496 
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Figure 3.1Boxplot depicting change in SOC against the depth of soil (cm) with 15cm interval 
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Figure 3.2  “Bubble” plots20 of Meta regression line of the ∆SOC (NT-CT) against the initial 
SOC level 
                                                 
20
 A “bubble plot” is to a graph that a fitted regression line together with circles representing the 
estimates from each study, sized according to the precision of each estimate (the inverse of its 
within-study variance, 2i  ). The area of each circle is inversely proportional to the variance of 
the difference in ∆SOC sequestration rate estimate. 
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Figure 3.3  “Bubble” plots of Meta regression line of the ∆SOC (NT-CT) against the depth of 
SOC measured 
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Figure 3.4 “Bubble plot” with fitted meta-regression line ∆SOC against average temperature of 
the experimental sites. 
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Figure 3.5 Funnel plot, using SOC sequestration rate against their standard error
21
 
 
                                                 
21
 The diagonal lines representing the 95% confidence limits around the summary treatment 
effect, i.e., [summary effect estimate ± (1.96 × standard error)] for each standard error on the 
vertical axis. This shows the expected distribution of studies in the absence of selection biasesy, 
95% of the studies should lie within the funnel defined by these straight lines. Because these 
lines are not strict 95% limits, they are referred to as “pseudo 95% confidence limits” (Sterne 
and Harbord, 2004).Results from small studies will therefore scatter widely at the bottom of the 
graph, with the spread narrowing among larger studies. In the absence of bias, the plot will 
resemble a symmetrical, inverted funnel.   
89 
 
 
-2
0
2S
N
D
 o
f e
ffe
ct
 e
st
im
at
e
0 20 40 60 80 100
Precision
Study regression line
 95% CI for intercept
 
Figure 3.6 Publication biases estimated using Egger test 
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Figure 3.7 Normal probability plot of standardized shrunken residuals 
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Appendix 3 
Table 8 Summary of the data from published studies used in a meta-regression analysis of SOC 
sequestration under no-till (NT) and conventional tillage (CT) 
Author 
Rate of ∆soc, 
Mg C ha
-1
 yr
-1
 
Initial SOC, 
Mg C ha
-1
 
Duration, 
Year 
Soil depth, 
cm State 
 Venterea et.al (2006) -0.20 70.6 5 20 MN 
 Venterea et.al (2006) 1.00 62.8 5 20 MN 
 Venterea et.al (2006) -2.10 101.8 5 30 MN 
 Venterea et.al (2006) -1.60 92.2 5 30 MN 
 Venterea et.al (2006) -2.50 135.0 5 45 MN 
 Venterea et.al (2006) -8.10 119.5 5 45 MN 
 Venterea et.al (2006) -2.70 158.6 5 60 MN 
 Venterea et.al (2006) -12.0 139.2 5 60 MN 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.24 29.8 12 15 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.45 28.6 12 15 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.22 43.0 12 30 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.45 46.0 12 30 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.32 47.8 12 45 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.42 46.0 12 45 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.37 49.5 12 60 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.46 52.3 12 60 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.32 53.3 12 75 IL 
Olson et.al (2005) 0.56 51.4 12 75 IL 
Jareckia et.al (2004) 0.39 44.9 13 30 OH 
Jareckia et.al (2004) 0.38 54.4 14 30 OH 
Ussiri & Lal (2008) 0.00 44.8 43 30 OH 
Ussiri & Lal (2008) 2.00 45.3 43 30 OH 
Ussiri & Lal (2008) 0.0001 20.8 43 15 OH 
Ussiri & Lal (2008) -0.002 21.9 43 15 OH 
 Khan et.al (2007) -0.70 34.7 51 15 IL 
 Khan et.al (2007) 2.20 34.7 51 15 IL 
 Khan et.al (2007) -0.30 42.0 51 15 IL 
 Khan et.al (2007) 0.40 37.1 51 15 IL 
 Khan et.al (2007) 3.70 94.3 51 46 IL 
 Khan et.al (2007) -0.30 94.3 51 46 IL 
 Khan et.al (2007) -10.70 119.6 51 46 IL 
 Khan et.al (2007) -2.43 102.7 51 46 IL 
Verma et.al (2005) -1.13 37.9 4 15 NE 
Verma et.al (2005) -0.51 68.8 4 30 NE 
Verma et.al (2005) -0.80 34.8 4 15 NE 
Verma et.al (2005) -0.04 62.9 4 30 NE 
Verma et.al (2005) -1.30 34.6 4 15 NE 
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Verma et.al (2005) -0.40 64.0 4 30 NE 
Moorman et.al (2004) -3.40 28.1 12 15 IA 
Moorman et.al (2004) -7.00 48.4 12 15 IA 
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005) 7.90 44.6 7 15 IA 
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005) 1.80 35.7 7 15 IA 
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005) 6.90 38.0 7 15 IA 
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005) 2.00 30.3 7 15 IA 
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005) 6.90 38.9 7 15 IA 
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005) 7.70 43.5 7 15 IA 
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007) -4.76 55.3 15 60 OH 
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007) -6.63 39.1 12 60 OH 
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007) 3.34 34.4 30 60 OH 
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007) 4.94 40.9 10 60 PA 
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007) -2.65 43.5 8 60 PA 
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007) 1.98 54.7 20 60 PA 
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007) 1.62 43.0 5 60 PA 
Varvel  (2006) -5.60 52.7 10 30 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -4.30 53.8 10 30 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -3.10 54.7 10 30 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -3.50 57.5 10 30 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -3.00 55.8 10 30 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -2.20 56.0 10 30 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -2.90 29.4 10 15 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -2.30 30.5 10 15 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -1.70 31.2 10 15 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -1.80 30.7 10 15 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -1.40 30.2 10 15 NE 
Varvel  (2006) -0.80 30.2 10 15 NE 
Russell et.al (2005) -1.47 32.8 12 15 IA 
Russell et.al (2005) -1.23 35.1 12 15 IA 
Russell et.al (2005) -0.47 38.4 12 15 IA 
Russell et.al (2005) 2.40 96.7 12 15 IA 
Russell et.al (2005) 4.05 85.5 12 15 IA 
Russell et.al (2005) 5.10 79.9 12 15 IA 
Pikul et.al (2008) -2.30 32.0 11 15 ND 
Pikul et.al (2008) -1.77 31.4 11 15 ND 
Pikul et.al (2008) -5.86 28.0 11 15 ND 
Pikul et.al (2008) -2.54 32.9 11 15 ND 
Pikul et.al (2008) -2.92 34.3 11 15 ND 
Pikul et.al (2008) -3.94 33.8 11 15 ND 
Jagadamma et.al (2007) 4.48 71.2 23 30 IL 
 
